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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past years mergers and acquisitions have been the leading strategies for 
expansion, growing the business as well as tapping into new markets. They are 
commonly used as the preferred method of rapid growth as the companies merge 
resources to create access to innovation and expanding the business. 
The majority of empirical literature in the South African context focuses on stock 
returns after the announcement of the mergers and acquisitions, as well as analysing 
the method of payment, whether cash or issue of shares. 
This research explored the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the shareholder 
value of Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed acquiring companies when acquiring a 
private company compared to acquiring a public company. The study analysed the 
impact of a merger and acquisition announcement on the overall shares. The focus 
point was analysing the difference in returns when an acquiring company acquired 
control in a private company compared to when an acquiring company targeted a 
public listed company. 
A quantitative approach was utilised for the purpose of this research. An event study 
methodology was used with three window day periods being used, namely 3 days, 21 
days and 41 days. The research included companies that were involved in mergers 
and acquisitions from 2011 to 2016 and the sample size was 94 companies. The 
results indicated that the acquisitions of private companies had statistically significant 
positive returns to the shareholders of the acquiring company. The acquisition of public 
listed companies did not, however, add value to the shareholders as the returns were 
not significant. 
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DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
 
“Abnormal returns (AR)”:  The differences between a single stock or portfolio's 
performance and the expected return over a set period of time.  
“Acquiring company”:  The company that purchases the target company's stock and 
other assets, which allows the acquiring company to make decisions regarding the 
newly acquired assets without the approval of the target company's shareholders. 
“Acquisition”: The process of acquiring a company to build on the strengths or 
weaknesses of the acquiring company. 
“Announcement date”: The date upon which the acquiring company confirms that it 
intends to make a formal offer to a target company, thereby creating public awareness. 
“Average abnormal returns (AAR)”: This relates to AARs over the 3 days, 21 days 
and 41 days window periods. 
“Cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR)”: The sum of ARs. 
“Event study methodology (EVM)”: is a statistical method to assess the impact of 
an event on the value of a firm. For example, the announcement of a merger between 
two business entities can be analysed to see whether investors believe the merger will 
create or destroy value. 
“IRESS”: Australian software company specialising in the development of software 
systems and services for financial markets and wealth management. The company 
provides services to stockbrokers, financial institutions and research analysts 
“Listed company”: Those companies which are included and trade on a stock 
exchange. 
“Merger”:  A combination of two companies into one entity. 
“Mergers and acquisitions (M&A)”: A general term that refers to the consolidation 
of companies or assets through various types of financial transactions. M&As can 
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include several different transactions, such as mergers, acquisitions, consolidations, 
tender offers, purchase of assets and management acquisitions. 
“Non-listed public company”:  A company which is not listed on any stock exchange 
but can have an unlimited number of shareholders to raise capital for any commercial 
venture. 
“Post-acquisition period”: The event window period of 1 day, 10 days and 20 days 
after the announcement date of a M&A or acquisition. 
“Pre-acquisition period”:  The event window period of 1 day, 10 days and 20 days 
prior to the announcement date of a M&A. 
“Private company”: A company whose shares may not be offered to the public for 
sale and which operates under legal requirements less strict than those for a public 
company. 
“Public company”: A company whose shares are traded freely on the stock 
exchange. 
“Target company”: A company that has been chosen as an attractive M&A or 
acquisition option by a potential acquirer. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AAR   Average Abnormal Returns 
ALSI   All Share Index  
AR   Abnormal Returns 
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CAAR   Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
EGARCH Error Estimation Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedastic 
EVM   Event Study Methodology 
FTSE   Financial Times Stock Exchange 
GARCH  Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic 
JSE   Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
M&A   Merger(s) and Acquisition(s) 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
UK   United Kingdom 
US   United States 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Research background 
Over the past years, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were considered the leading 
strategy for expansion, growing the business, as well as tapping into new markets 
(Ndlovu, 2017). M&As are commonly used as the preferred method of rapid growth. 
According to Chatterjee (2000), M&As are one of the preeminent methods of corporate 
restructuring that have increased substantial prominence in both developing and in 
developed countries. M&As are usually motivated by the desire to acquire resources 
that the acquiring entity does not have, with the aim of obtaining market dominance 
(Vazirani, 2012). Zuhairy, Taher and Shafei (2015) mentioned that M&As are 
considered a fundamental part of business restructuring around the world. With 
markets changing all the time, only the most creative businesses survive the tight 
competition. 
Corporate restructuring is defined as an act of reorganising operational ownership, 
and all other relevant structures of a company in order to make it more profitable 
(Gaughan, 2010). M&A Market (2014) mentioned that South Africa has an advantage 
in the sub-Saharan region. This is because South Africa continues to be the engine of 
growth in Africa, for companies looking to expand their businesses. South African 
institutions are expected to play an important role in financing development strategies. 
According to M&A Market (2014), there has been a positive increase in deal volumes 
in the African continent, particularly in the energy, mining, and telecommunications 
sectors, and South Africa has been a leader when it comes to M&As as the business 
environment has matured. 
Figure 1.1 overleaf represents movements in M&As globally, inclusive of South Africa, 
for the period 2010 to 2016. Between 2010 and 2013, M&A activity remained stable. 
Following this, in 2014 M&A activity increased significantly by approximately 
$1 401 billion. This was due to the global economy showing good signs of recovery 
from the 2008 great recession. Therefore, the appetite for M&As increased 
significantly (The Atlantic, 2016). According to The Atlantic (2016), M&A activities in 
2015 were the biggest; there were, also many mega deals (deals above $5 billion) 
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concluded in 2015. There was a decrease in the 2016 mergers due to a large number 
of merger applications that were still pending approval due to environmental concerns, 
and there were less mega deals compared to 2015 (The Atlantic, 2016). 
 
Figure 1. 1: Global trends in M&As 
Source: Statista: The Statistics Portal (2018) 
Figure 1.2 overleaf represents trends in M&As, specifically in an African context. It 
covers the period 2011 to 2016. In Africa, M&A activity increased slightly between 
2011 and 2012. Subsequent to this, M&A activity declined. In Africa, the M&A activity 
declined in 2014 compared to the prior year due to delays in the approval processes 
(Finance24, 2015). However, in 2015, the M&A wave increased substantially by more 
than 100%, from $26 billion to $58 billion. This is attributable to the economy showing 
good signs of recovery from the 2008 great recession (Statista: The Statistics Portal, 
2018). The 2015 year had two mega deals that exceeded $5 billion dollars. In 2016, 
while the quantity of M&A transactions remained large, no mega deals took place and 
hence the total M&A value was less when compared to 2015 (Statista: The Statistics 
Portal, 2018). 
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Figure 1. 2: M&A trends in Africa 
Source: Statista: The Statistics Portal (2018) 
Ndadza (2014) posited that M&As are important to the South African economy as they 
have been used extensively by companies to create firm competence and grow their 
core business by obtaining a larger market share and increasing profitability, thus 
increasing shareholder value. Furthermore, Chatterjee (2000) also emphasised that 
companies that have engaged in M&As have the capability of decreasing the costs of 
operating the business. Shah and Arora (2014) suggested that, in today’s dynamic 
business environment, companies are forced to look for expansion by acquiring or 
merging with other companies. This desire for change drives entities to show an 
interest in M&As that they can actually use for levering them to create value for 
shareholders. For the value to be created, the costs should be less than the benefit 
received. However, these opportunities are difficult to find, mostly due to the 
differences between the companies involved. Cultural differences and how they 
operate might have a direct impact on the returns generated after the M&A. Most 
companies view M&As with an expectation of creating shareholder value by reducing 
the costs, thereby increasing productivity (Shah and Arora, 2014). One of the common 
reasons why shareholders agree to M&As is because they hope that the results will 
improve the financial performance of their companies. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) have 
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concluded that even though M&As are one of the important growth tactics, their 
success in creating shareholder value for acquiring companies is still contested. 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) discovered that M&As usually destroy the 
shareholder value of the acquiring entity. Zuhairy et al. (2015) supported this by stating 
that most of the M&As do not add value to the stakeholders of the acquiring company, 
and one of the common reasons is that managers do not realise that merging with 
another company involves a lot more than taking control of assets. Contrary to this, 
Ward and Muller (2010) found that the M&A announcements had a favourable effect 
on the returns with cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) as high as ten percent, thus 
shareholder value was created for the acquiring company. Finally, Ndlovu (2017) 
concluded that M&A announcements brought positive returns, but these returns were 
not significant, therefore no value was created for the shareholders due to M&As. 
 Problem statement 
M&As are considered to play a very vital role in South Africa as they have the potential 
either to increase the shareholder value or to destroy it. The contribution to the 
economy comes in different forms. In cases where an acquiring company targets a 
company that is faced with financial problems, an acquisition helps to minimise loss of 
jobs. In most cases larger businesses are able to sustain themselves even in 
recessionary times, but small companies feel the pressure, even to the extent of 
closing down. This is where M&As play a big role to prevent job losses and to ensure 
that production continues. In some instances M&As are planned to eliminate 
competition, such as the failed M&A of Clover SA acquiring Dairy Day in 2018. 
Over the past twenty years, M&As across the globe have caught the attention of 
academics and practitioners. The studies have drawn attention to various aspects of 
M&A activity, characteristics of M&A transactions, as well as gains and losses to the 
shareholders (Dutta & Jog, 2009). According to Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005), the earnings received after the announcements of the M&As were profitable 
for the acquiring companies, in aggregate, which resulted in the creation of value for 
stakeholders. On the other hand, Sehleanu (2015) stated that when entities merge 
with other entities for the purpose of increasing stakeholder value, in most instances, 
the end result has been the opposite. Ndlovu (2017) analysed share announcements 
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returns in South Africa and concluded that returns were favourable but not substantial. 
Therefore, the shareholders of the acquiring company did not obtain any value.  
The majority of empirical literature in the South African context has focused on  returns 
after the announcement date of the M&As, as well as analysing the method of 
payment, whether in cash or by issue of shares (Lusyana & Sherif, 2016). The 
previous studies done in South Africa did not focus on the specific returns earned 
when an acquiring company merges with either a private or a public company. For 
example, Halfar (2011) focused on analysing whether the acquiring company created 
or destroyed shareholder value by analysing the difference between pre and post-
acquisition returns. Viljoen (2014) focused on the effects of cross border mergers and 
acquisitions on the performance of the acquiring company. Finally, Ndlovu (2017) 
focused on analysing the stock market reaction to M&A announcements specifically 
on Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies. 
The majority of literature reviewed ( for example, Dilshad, 2013; Viljoen, 2014; and 
Ficici, 2018) have highlighted that M&As do not add any value to the shareholders of 
the acquiring company. It is quite possible that before companies embark on M&As, 
they do not analyse which acquisitions add value to the shareholders. That might lead 
to mergers that are not profitable, thus not adding any value to the shareholders. The 
majority of M&As involve private companies and therefore, without this knowledge, 
acquiring companies may continue to target other companies which will not add value. 
The studies that have been carried out have not analysed the returns earned when 
the acquiring company obtains control in a private company or the returns earned 
when obtaining control in a public company. Therefore, this research will close that 
gap by analysing the returns earned by obtaining control in a private company 
compared to returns earned when obtaining control in a public company.  
This research explores the impact of M&As on earnings in terms of the stakeholder 
value of the acquiring company after the M&A. The study will analyse the effect on 
announcing M&As on overall shares. The focus point will be analysing the difference 
in returns when the acquiring entity acquires majority of the votes of a private entity 
compared to when the acquiring company targets a public listed company. 
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 Research question and objectives  
The aim of this research is to analyse the impact of M&As on shareholder value of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies when acquiring a private enity 
compared to when acquiring a public entity. The overall research question is: 
• What is the impact of M&As on the shareholder value of the JSE listed 
acquiring company when acquiring a private company compared to when 
acquiring a public company? 
To answer this question, this research has the following objectives: 
• To examine the share price movement of the acquiring company for any 
abnormal return (AR) earned after the M&A; 
• To analyse any statistical significant differences between returns earned 
before the M&A and returns earned after the M&A; and 
• To determine whether there is a difference in AR when acquiring a private 
company compared to when acquiring a public listed company. 
 Significance of the study 
This study will focus on the period after the great recession in 2008. From 2010 the 
economy was showing great signs of recovery from the recession and companies 
were gaining confidence in M&As. Globally, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
the most recent study comparing ARs obtained when acquiring listed versus non listed 
companies was in 2007 by Capron and Shen (2007). Globally, Hansen and Lott (1996) 
in the US performed a study to analyse the returns for acquisitions of 252 private and 
public companies from. Their results illustrated that acquiring companies gained 
significant positive returns when acquiring a private company. Similarly, Conn, Cosh, 
Guest and Hughes (2005) performed a study on 4, 000 acquisitions where they 
examined private and public acquisitions. Their results also illustrated that the 
acquisitions of private companies in the UK resulted in significant positive AR. Lastly, 
Capron and Shen (2007) also concluded that the acquisitions of private companies 
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produced a positive stock market reaction compared to the acquisitions of public 
companies. This was from the analysis of 101 US companies. 
This means that there is a gap in the research after the recession, that focuses on 
comparing the ARs obtained by the listed acquiring company when acquiring another 
listed company, to the ARs earned after a listed acquiring company obtains control of 
a non-listed company. In South Africa, the current literature focuses on the overall ARs 
obtained by the listed company when the acquiring company is obtaining control of 
any other company. The most recent study that was carried out in South Africa on 
M&As by Ndlovu (2017) focused on overall returns to shareholders after the merger 
announcements. In South Africa there has been no focus on comparing ARs earned 
by a listed company obtaining control of another listed company to ARs earned when 
a listed company obtains control of a private company. This might be due to the fact 
that South Africa is an emerging market while the other studies were performed in the 
UK and in US which are developed markets.  
This study will uncover the acquisitions that will contribute to significant ARs for the 
acquiring company by analysing the acquisitions of a listed company compared to the 
acquisitions of a private company. Consequently, the findings of this study will 
contribute to improved acquisition processes and a possible subsequent improvement 
on shareholder value of M&As. This study will contribute positively to the 
aforementioned knowledge gap through the sharing of its results with academics in 
the accounting industry. This study will also contribute significantly to the accounting 
and business economics industry by offering evidence-based recommendations for 
future M&A transactions. 
 Outline of the study 
This chapter has provided a prelude to the study as well as motivation for the research. 
Chapter Two introduces the underlying theories on which the M&As’ study theories 
are predicated. It also reviews the existing empirical evidence. Chapter Three details 
the methodology utilised in the study with the results being presented in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Five discusses the final conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 Introduction 
Chapter One identified the research question as to what the impact is of M&As on the 
shareholder value of the JSE listed acquiring company when acquiring a private 
company compared to acquiring a public company. The focus point will be the  
differerence in CAAR when the listed acquiring company obtains control in another 
listed company compared to obtaining control in a private company. This chapter 
introduces the different types of M&As, followed by reasons for M&As. Theoretical 
literature is discussed in line with the research area. The empirical evidence is 
presented. Lastly, the hypothesis testing is developed. 
 Types of mergers and acquisitions 
Roberts, Wallace and Moles (2003) defined M&As as a combination of two companies 
into one. The distinguishing factor between a merger and an acquisition is influenced 
by the technique used to bring the entities together. For a merger there is a back-and-
forth conversation between the two companies before the merger. In an acquisition, 
there is no negotiation. The acquired company might be taken over and it might cease 
to exist. Similarly, Gaughan (2010) defined M&As as a combination of two companies 
after which only one company, the merged company, will exist. In all instances, the 
acquiring company takes over the liabilities as well as the assets of the acquired 
company. Epstein (2004) found that academic literature often does not distinguish 
between M&As, and the terms are used interchangeably. Accordingly, this research 
will also use the terms “mergers” and “acquisitions” interchangeably. 
There are three different types of M&As, namely vertical merger, horizontal merger 
and conglomeration merger.  
A vertical merger is completed with the aim of coalescing two companies that are in 
the same value chain of engendering the same goods and service, but the only 
distinction is the stage of engenderment at which they are operating (Gaughan, 2010). 
A typical example is when a manufacturing company merges with a raw material 
supplier. Vertical integration is usually an attempt to reduce the risk relating to 
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suppliers. Such M&As are associated with operational synergies where companies 
merge to reduce the dependence on other companies (Cleverism, 2018).  
A horizontal merger transpires when an entity takes over another company that offers 
identical products or services to the consumers. Companies are usually direct 
competitors in this case, hence this type of M&A is usually associated with collusive 
synergies, price control, and anti-competitive structures (Gaughan, 2010).  
A conglomerate merger transpires when two different entities that usually operate in 
diverse industries merge. After merging they continue to operate in different industries 
or sectors. This is usually done to diversify the business into other industries to limit 
the business risk. Conglomerate M&As are usually associated with financial synergies 
as the companies that engage in these M&As compete for profitable assets that will 
expand the business (Roberts et al., 2003). 
 Reasons for M&As 
M&As are useful growth strategies in terms of expanding the business externally 
(Rahman, Ali & Jebran, 2018). They continue to be the most popular strategic growth 
method (Loana, 2015). According to M&A Market (2014), M&As continue to be the 
most popular growth strategy for many companies and are the fastest way of growing 
the company. Stakeholders expect managers to expand the business and this puts 
pressure on managers to come up with growth strategies. Some managers take M&As 
as a preferred growth method, because they generate strong alliance with other 
companies to improve value for the stockholders (Bramson, 2000). M&As are 
important financial tools that allow companies to grow much faster and to provide 
returns to investors (Njambi & Kariuki, 2018). They have been used widely across the 
globe as one of the tools for enabling corporate external expansions by way of 
acquiring majority shares in another company; thereby obtaining majority control. 
M&As can also be done by acquiring assets in another company and combining the 
companies for the acquiring company to gain full effective control of the market 
(Ndadza, 2014). Similarly, Viljoen (2014) stated that M&As are considered to be part 
of the common mechanism that empowers the company to grow.  
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Evidence compiled by Mukherjee, Kiymaz and Baker (2004) found that the main 
reasons why companies prefer M&As as a growth method are to achieve the operating 
synergies, diversification, tax considerations, as well as management incentives. 
Combining two companies can also destroy the value to shareholders if managers 
mismanage the capital by financing lines that are not profitable. The primary motive 
for most entities that merge is to create more value for the merged entity, thus 
increasing shareholder’s value (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2002). When a M&A is 
successful it can serve as a platform for corporate growth, leading to an improved 
market share, thus decreasing the costs across multiple products and reducing the 
expenses by eliminating duplicate costs (Hitt, Harison & Ireland, 2001).  
2.3.1 Improving the company’s performance 
One of the key aspects for value creation for stakeholders involves improving the 
performance of the company that is being acquired. When two companies are 
combined, there is high probability that one can obtain a bigger market stake, therefore 
increasing revenue and profits and improving the value of the combined companies. 
Profit margins can be improved if redundancies and inefficiencies are removed from 
operations. Cartwright and Cooper (1992) suggested that between 50 to 80 percent of 
M&As are considered unsuccessful financially in the long term, as they fail to achieve 
the financial synergies. Synergies transpire when two operating divisions are run 
effectively and efficiently, using less resources. By using less resources, the company 
is lowering the average costs of running the business (Lubatkin, 1983). 
M&As result in an overall benefit to the shareholders when the value of the combined 
entity is greater than the value of the two individual entities. The main cause of the 
gain is related to the performance improvement of the M&A (Piloff & Santomero, 
1998).  Hitt et al. (2001) concluded that synergies imply that gains accumulate to the 
acquiring company through improved operating efficiency which improves the market 
power over competitors. The acquisition of target companies with operations similar 
to the acquiring company are expected to yield significant synergies and improved 
financial performance. Companies participate in the M&A market to seek value 
increasing opportunities to combine their assets with the target company. Through this 
process, companies can improve their productivity with a related change in profitability 
(David, 2017). 
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2.3.2 Accelerated growth  
In some instances, M&As are undertaken to increase market share, to decrease the 
costs per product while at the same time increasing volumes, thus accelerating growth. 
The impact of a bigger market share results in growth to the profits and an increase in 
returns to the stakeholders of the acquiring entity. The combined entity usually benefits 
from several segments of the industry (Gaughan, 2010). 
2.3.3 Acquire skills and technology 
Entities often merge or acquire other companies with the aim of obtaining the skills 
and technology of the target company. Some companies have exclusive rights to 
certain technologies. It may also be more expensive to develop the required skills and 
technologies from scratch. This means that it would be cheaper to acquire a company 
that has the desired skills and technology (Cleverism, 2018). 
 Theoretical Literature 
According to Firth (1980), there are two major competing theories when it comes to 
M&As, namely, the neo-classical profit maximisation theory, and the maximising 
management utility theory. These theories are now discussed:  
2.4.1 Neo classical profit maximisation theory  
This theory states that the competitive market forces generally motivate companies to 
maximise the wealth of their shareholders. The theory suggests that companies will 
participate in M&As if the transaction will increase the shareholder’s wealth in the 
acquiring company. Recent research by Njambi and Kariuki (2018) stated that some 
entities participate in M&As only to meet increasing demands from shareholders. The 
study also mentioned that companies merge to diversify into international markets and 
gain access to expensive modern technologies. This leads to increased profitability for 
shareholders. Piloff and Santomero (1998) argued that M&As are driven by the belief 
that benefits will accrue to the acquiring company by improving the penetration ratio 
of the market share, and thus improve profitability which would lead to increasing 
shareholder value. Two theories falling under the neo-classical profit maximisation 
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theory are the efficiency theory and the monopoly power theory. How these two 
theories can lead to value for shareholders will now be discussed. 
2.4.1.1 Efficiency theory 
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter and Davison (2009) explain that companies 
merge to increase their market power and efficiency, thereby creating value for 
shareholders. Generally, M&As are accomplished with the main goal of increasing 
value of the company, and this is usually achieved by creating efficiency (Hitt et al., 
2001). Trautwein (1990) concluded that the efficiency theory comes with the belief that 
M&As are planned and completed to obtain goals.   
There are three key synergies in the efficiency theory. Financial synergy usually 
results in lower costs of capital, by lowering the risk of the company’s portfolio. The 
synergy is achieved by investing in unrelated business (Trautwein, 1990). 
Operational synergy is usually achieved by combining operations, as well as the 
transfer of information. Piloff and Santomero (1998) explained that many M&As are 
inspired by the belief that a big amount of unnecessary operating expenses could be 
removed through grouping them together. Finally, managerial synergy relates to the 
benefits that are realised when the acquiring managers have superior planning and 
monitoring abilities that benefit the acquired company’s performance (Trautwein, 
1990).   
2.4.1.2 Monopoly power theory 
Firth (1980) alludes to the fact that profitability can be increased through synergies 
and also through the creation of monopoly power by eliminating competition. In 
addition, Trautwein (1990) proposed that there is a monopoly power theory which 
states that M&As are planned and implemented to achieve a monopoly from increased 
market power, which can be obtained through, amongst other things, the reduction of 
supply, discouraging potential new entrants and cross-subsidising products. Rapid 
technological changes and globalisation lead to companies facing high competition 
and ending up resorting to M&As to improve their competitiveness in the market by 
increasing their market share through M&As (Kivindu, 2013). In some instances, 
companies merge to eliminate competition, especially when the demand for a product 
is starting to decrease. Then a company will merge in order to acquire a bigger market 
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share. M&As are presumed to create cost synergies as the costs of operating the 
business are reduced and the production costs are reorganised to create efficiency. 
Market power advantages allow wealth to be transferred from the customers and 
suppliers to the shareholders, thus creating the scale of economies as the company 
exploits the opportunities to expand.  
2.4.2 Maximising management utility theory  
The second major theory to explain M&As is the maximising management utility 
theory. This theory argues that, besides achieving certain levels of profits, managers 
will sometimes attempt to maximise their own interests. These interests do not 
necessarily go along with maximisation of the wealth of stakeholders. This is also 
known as the agency theory, which is when a principal organisation or person chooses 
to hire an agent to perform his or her duties. The two parties might have different 
interests and the principal cannot enforce the agent directly to make sure that they act 
in their best interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Interests of the agents include factors 
such as obtaining high salary increases, even when the company is not performing 
well, thus reducing the risks associated with losing their jobs and increasing their 
power. Trautwein (1990) extended this by suggesting an empire-building theory which 
argues that M&As are planned and implemented by managers who want to maximise 
their own personal wealth rather than that of the shareholder.  
In summary, the shareholder maximisation theory develops the expectation that the 
M&A will lead to increased profits. For the M&A to be justified, there are expectations 
that wealth for the shareholder is created. On the other hand, the management utility 
theory does not necessarily expect that the wealth for the shareholders is created. 
Instead, an increase in firm size is expected to increase the benefits that the manager 
is likely to receive (Firth, 1980).  
The empirical evidence will now be reviewed. 
 Empirical Literature  
2.5.1 Share price performance 
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M&As continue to be the common way for corporate restructuring. In South Africa 
alone, for the 2011 financial year, there were 284 M&As, which equates to 
approximately 23 M&As every month (Competition Commission, 2018). Even though 
the M&As are popular, the evidence shows that they provide mixed performance to 
the stakeholders of the acquiring entity. The stakeholders of target firm usually enjoy 
a short-run positive return while the investors in the bidding company usually 
experience a decrease in terms of the shares, usually after the M&A’s announcement 
(Cartwright & Schoenburg, 2006). M&As generally result in an overall benefit to the 
shareholders when the value of the two entities that are brought together is more than 
the value of two individual entities. The main cause of the gain is related to the 
performance improvement after the M&A (Piloff & Santomero, 1998). 
The performance measure of M&As consists of inspecting how the share price of the 
acquiring entity is performing over a period (Papadakis & Thanos, 2010). Recent 
studies carried out by Viljoen (2014), Lusyana and Sherif (2016) and Ndlovu (2017) 
used an event study methodology (EVM) to examine the significant AR to the 
shareholders. Therefore, it measured directly whether value was created for investors. 
Below is empirical literature that shows the different results, including insignificant 
returns, negative returns, as well as positive returns. 
2.5.1.1 Insignificant returns 
Ghosh (2001) completed a study on 315 US companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) from 1981 to 1995 using EVM, with a window period of 61 days 
(30, 0, 30), where day 0 represents the day of the M&A announcement. The results 
from the findings showed that the pre-announcement returns, and post announcement 
returns, showed insignificant positive results. Halfar (2011) also found that, normally, 
the AR to stakeholders of the acquiring company were insignificant on the share price 
performance. The observation was from a sample of 29 SA M&As analysing entities 
listed on the JSE from 2000 to 2009 using EVM, with a window period of 757 trading 
days (30, 0, 726). 
According to Dilshad (2013), target banks earned significant positive earnings after 
the M&A whereas AR for the banks that were acquiring were short-lived because by 
the end of the event window, which was 61 days (30, 0, 30), the returns were zero. 
This was from a sample of 18 UK deals of M&As using EVM from 2001 to 2010.  
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Viljoen (2014) also examined the cross-border M&As using EVM as well as financial 
ratios for a 41-day (20, 0, 20) window period. The focus was on entities listed on the 
JSE with the sample size of 44 SA companies. The findings showed AR that were 
classified as insignificant positive results. Similarly, Humphery-Jenner, Sautner and 
Suchard (2017) carried out a study on the role of private equity companies on cross-
border United States (US) M&As using an 11-day (5, 0, 5) window period. They applied 
EVM and discovered that, normally, after the M&A announcement, there was no 
substantial increase to the returns on the cross-border M&As with private equity 
companies.  
Ficici (2018) scrutinised the market response from the announcement of United 
Kigdom (UK) M&As to see whether they created value for stakeholders using EVM for 
the period 2006 to 2016 applying a 21-day (10, 0, 10) window period. The results 
showed that the value creation seemed to be insignificant during the intervals used in 
the event study. Ahmed, Manwani and Ahmed (2018) completed an analysis on the 
M&As as a method of growth tactic for banks in Pakistan. The study analysed M&As 
from 2005 to 2016 with a 41-day (20, 0, 20) window period. Their findings showed that, 
on average, there was no impact on the pre-M&A returns and post-M&A returns. This 
was attributable to the financial crisis that resulted in banks increasing deposits and 
interest rates; and inflation rates also went up. This supports the management utility 
theory as there were returns received by the stakeholders after the M&A. Next, 
negative returns will be reviewed. 
2.5.1.2 Negative returns 
Bruner (2002), in a study performed in the US applying the EVM from 1971-2001 using 
a 1 251-day (60, 0, 1190) window period, concluded that the acquiring companies’ 
shareholders did not get any returns after the announcement of the M&A. His sample 
size was 130 companies that were part of M&As.  
Kinateder, Fabich and Wagner (2017) studied domestic M&As in Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS) to analyse whether there was any benefit created 
from the M&A transactions for the company that was acquiring as well as the company 
that was targeted. They used the EVM with a sample of 50 public listed companies 
from BRICS countries from 2006 to 2015 for a 21-day (10, 0, 10) window period. The 
findings from the research showed that shareholders of the targeted company got a 
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substantially high return at the announcement date of the M&A, whereas the 
shareholders of the acquiring company normally got a negative return.  
Rahman et al. (2018) performed a study on the effect of M&As on the share price 
behaviour in the banking industry. They used the EVM from 2002 to 2012 to analyse 
the pre- and post-M&A effect for a 91-day (20, 0, 70) window period. They discovered 
that some companies achieved significant positive AR while other companies obtained 
abnormal negative returns. On average, the companies achieved negative returns on 
the announcement of the M&A, implying that the shareholders were getting a negative 
return on the investments. 
Ferris, Jayaraman and Liao (2018) analysed companies that have busy board 
members who take part in M&As. A busy board member is defined as any board 
member who has three or more external director positions. Their sample was 47 360 
M&A deals announced from 1999 to 2012 in 69 countries with a 5-day (2, 0, 2) window 
period. The results showed that, normally, the market did not respond well to a M&A 
announcement of a company that had busy board members. The researchers believed 
that the acquiring companies’ busy board members overpaid for the acquired 
business. As a result, the company might not have been able to recover the money 
through synergies, assets, and return on equity.  
Gurr’s (2018) South African study analysed the impact of M&As by focusing on long 
term creation of value stakeholders from 2005 to 2010 using the financial ratios. Her 
findings highlighted that the performance of the acquiring entity decreased when 
focusing on the long term. Her study analysed the long term impact of M&As. This 
empirical evidence also supports the management utility theory as shareholders 
earned negative returns after the M&As. This implies that the transactions might have 
only benefited the interests of the managers, rather than the interests of the 
shareholders.  
Lastly, positive returns will be reviewed. 
2.5.1.3 Positive returns 
Contrary to the above studies which found no relationship or a negative relationship, 
in line with the neoclassical profit maximisation theory, some studies have found the 
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expected positive relationship. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) analysed the stock 
market valuation in the European banking industry by observing deals from 1988 to 
1997 using the EVM for a 5-day (2, 0, 2) window period. Their results showed positive 
AR relating to announcement of deals with domestic banks. Contrary to that was that 
M&As with foreign institutions yielded negative returns after the announcement of the 
M&A. 
Georgen and Renneboog (2004) noted that stakeholders of the acquiring entity obtain 
positive and significant returns for short term wealth creation using the EVM. Their 
sample was 228 deals on domestic and cross border M&A deals from 1993 until 2000 
for a 61-day (20, 0, 40) window period.  
Gattoufi, Al-Muharrami and Al-Kiyumi (2009) completed an assessment of commercial 
banks’ consolidations from 2003 to 2007. They selected 10 banks that went into M&As 
and compared them to the banks that did not participate in M&As. Their findings stated 
that the M&As resulted in favourable returns for the share value of the banks that 
participated as they realised improvements that were greater that the average. They 
used data envelopment analysis as well as EVM using an 11-day (5,0,5) window 
period. 
An analysis of wealth creation for M&As was carried out by Smrek and Perović (2018) 
in the US. They found that, in a sample of 587 companies from 1997 to 2012 using a 
5-day (2, 0, 2) window period, the acquiring companies had insignificant negative 
returns before the announcement of the M&As. The returns after the announcement 
were positive and significant.  
According to Van Essen (2018), the acquisition of companies that have high Corporate 
Social Responsibly (CSR) activities resulted in high positive AR for the acquiring 
companies, as these investments are considered to contribute to the society at large. 
Thus, they bring value to the stakeholders of the entity. This was based on a sample 
size of 309 US based companies that acquired companies that had high CSR 
activities, from 2002 to 2017, using the EVM for an 11-day (5,0,5) window period.  
Fich, Nguyen and Officer (2018), using the EVM, explained that the acquisitions of 
small companies resulted in significant positive gains. Their study was performed in 
the US with a sample size of 2 297 companies from 1996 to 2008 for a 5-day (2, 0, 2) 
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window period. This supports the neo-classical profit maximisation theory as the 
shareholders earned positive returns after the transactions. 
2.5.2 Acquisition of public listed company versus acquisition of a private 
company 
As seen from the empirical evidence above, there has been mixed evidence regarding 
the reaction of M&As on shareholder value. Some studies argued that the returns 
earned by the acquiring company are insignificant while others concluded that the 
returns are negative. A potential reason could be the initial motives behind the M&As. 
For example, if a manager acquires a company simply for the reason of obtaining 
certain levels of profits, that manager will only be acting in their best interests and not 
necessarily in the interest of the shareholders. A further reason could be that the prior 
studies failed to consider whether a private or public company was acquired. The 
agency view predicts that private acquisitions result in better returns compared to 
acquisitions of public companies. This is because public companies are affected by 
separation of ownership and control, thus incurring agency costs, while private 
companies are usually owner-managed (Golubov and Xiong, 2018). This study 
therefore will focus on analysing the difference in CAAR (cumulative abnormal returns) 
should the acquirer acquire a private company compared to acquiring a public 
company.  
Capron and Shen (2007) explained that the difference in availability of information on 
private companies versus public listed companies influenced the acquirer’s choice of 
the target company. The information on private companies is usually very limited and 
this has an impact on the breadth of due diligence performed by the acquirer (Reuer 
& Ragozzino, 2007). This increases the risk of performing an incorrect evaluation of 
the precise value of the targeted entity. Acquiring a private entity usually raises 
interesting questions as to whether the market can value the M&A under asymmetric 
information conditions (Yuce & Ng, 2005). Asymmetric information conditions happen 
when there is limited public information about the targeted entity, and where the 
acquiring company knows more information about the target company’s value than 
the public does (Yuce and Ng, 2005). 
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Makadok and Barney (2001) mentioned that the absence of information on private 
companies provides a chance for acquiring companies to use that to their advantage. 
Therefore, the absence of information usually results in acquiring companies obtaining 
AR as the assets are normally understated. Research undertaken by Hansen and Lott 
(1996) in the US analysed returns for acquisitions of 252 private and public companies 
from 1984 to 1994 using a 21-day (5,0,15) window period. Their findings showed that 
acquiring companies gained significant positive returns when acquiring a private 
company. Similarly, Chang (1998) also completed his analysis of US private company 
acquisitions compared to public company acquisitions, with a sample of 285 
companies using a 31-day (15, 0, 15) window period. His conclusions presented that 
the acquiring entity earned positive AR when acquiring private companies. The 
acquisitions of public companies resulted in negative returns or insignificant positive 
results. 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) examined a sample of 3 135 US acquisitions of 
public and private companies from 1990 to 2000 using a 5-day (2, 0,2) window period. 
Their findings showed that companies acquiring private companies gained positive 
returns. The acquisitions of public companies resulted in negative returns. They 
attributed this to the fact that private companies have a liquidity discount which results 
in higher returns to the acquirer. Acquisitions of private companies yield positive 
returns mostly since they are smaller, and they are more responsive to investment 
opportunities. Conn et al. (2005) performed a study on 4 000 acquisitions where they 
examined private and public acquisitions using EVM with a 3- day (1, 0,1) window 
period. The study paid attention to the announcement date and post acquisitions stock 
returns. The findings showed that the acquisitions of private companies in the UK 
resulted in significant positive AR.  
Capron and Shen (2007) found that acquiring companies are more likely to acquire 
private companies that are in same industry as their core business or an area where 
they have accumulated acquisition experience. Acquiring companies are more likely 
to buy public listed companies when they enter into new business ventures. The 
acquisitions of private companies produced a positive stock market reaction compared 
to the acquisitions of public companies (Capron & Shen, 2007). This was from the 
analysis of 101 US companies for a 31-day (15, 0, 15) window period. 
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Based on the studies above it has been noted that the acquisition of private companies 
generally shows positive returns while the acquisition of public companies generally 
shows negative returns. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there has been no study done in South 
Africa that focuses on the returns earned when the listed acquiring company acquires 
control of a private company or compares this with acquiring control of a public 
company. 
 Summary of literature and development of hypotheses 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below presents a summary of the literature reviewed and 
hypothesis testing. 
Table 2. 1: Literature review summary table and hypotheses 
Author and Year 
Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Results for Acquiring 
Companies 
Insignificant Returns 
Ghosh (2001) 1981 - 1995 
315 US 
M&A Deals 
The results show insignificant 
returns to shareholders. 
Halfar (2011)  2000 - 2009 
29 SA M&A 
Deals 
Insignificant returns. 
Dilshad (2013)  2001 - 2010 
18 UK 
Deals 
Insignificant returns. 
Viljoen (2014)  2000 - 2013 
44 SA M&A 
Deals 
Insignificant positive results. 
Humphery-Jenner et 
al. (2017)  
1996 - 2008 
17, 409 US 
M&A Deals 
No significant increase on 
returns after the M&A. 
Ficici (2018) 2006 - 2016 
621 UK 
M&A Deals 
Insignificant returns. 
Ahmed et al. (2018) 2005 - 2016 
10 Banks 
Pakistan 
No Impact on the returns. 
Negative Returns 
Bruner (2002)  1971 - 2001 
130 US 
M&A Deals 
No Returns to the 
shareholders. 
Kinateder et al. 
(2017) 
2006 - 2015 
50 BRICS 
M&A Deals 
No Returns to the 
shareholders. 
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Author and Year 
Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Results for Acquiring 
Companies 
Rahman et al. (2018)  2002 - 2012 
121 M&A 
Deals 
Pakistan 
On average negative returns to 
shareholders. 
Ferris et al. (2018)  1999 - 2012 
47, 360 
M&A Deals 
Negative returns. 
Gurr (2018) 2005 - 2010 
66 SA M&A 
Deals 
Negative returns in the long 
run. 
Positive Returns 
Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000)  
1988 - 1997 
54 UK M&A 
Deals 
Positive AR. 
Georgen and 
Renneboog 2004 
1993 - 2000 
228 UK 
M&A Deals 
Positive AR. 
Gattoufi et al. (2009)  2003 - 2007 
10 Gulf 
countries 
M&A Deals 
Positive returns. 
Smrek, and Perović 
(2018)  
1997 - 2012 
587 US 
M&A Deals 
Average positive returns. 
Van Essen (2018) 2002 - 2017 
309 US 
M&A Deals 
Positive AR. 
Fich et al. (2018)  1996 - 2008 
2, 297 US 
M&A Deals 
Positive AR. 
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
Given the inconclusive results from the literature as seen in the summary above, the 
first hypothesis addresses the first objective, which is to examine the share price 
movement of the acquiring company for any abnormal return (AR) earned after the 
M&A. This hypothesis was drawn from the neoclassical profit maximisation theory that 
a M&A will increase shareholder value. 
H0: CAAR ≤ 0 
CAAR for mergers and acquisitions announcements is less than or equal to 
zero. 
H1: CAAR >0 
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CAAR for merger and acquisitions announcements is greater than zero for the 
acquiring company.  
HYPOTHESIS 2 
There is an expectation that returns earned after (CAARA) the M&As are greater than 
the returns earned before (CAARB) the M&As’ announcements. This addresses the 
second objective which aims at analysing any statistically significant differences 
between returns earned before the M&A and returns earned after the M&A. 
H0: CAARA – CAARB = 0 
The CAAR earned after the merger’s announcement is the same as the CAAR 
earned before the merger announcement. 
H1: CAARA – CAARB > 0  
The CAAR earned after the merger’s announcement is greater than the CAAR 
earned before the merger announcement. 
Table 2. 2: Public versus private literature review summary 
Public versus Private acquisitions 
Hansen and Lott 
(1996) 
1989 - 1990 
252 US 
M&A Deals 
Private acquisition positive AR. 
Chang (1998) 1981 - 1991 
285 US 
M&A Deals 
Private acquisition positive AR. 
Public acquisitions negative 
returns or insignificant. 
Fuller et al. (2002) 1990 - 2000 
3, 135 US 
M&A Deals 
Significant negative returns for 
public acquisitions and 
significant positive returns for 
private acquisitions. 
Conn et al.  (2005) 1984 - 1998 
4 ,000 UK 
M&A Deals 
Private acquisition positive AR.  
Capron and Shen 
(2007)  
1981 - 1992 
101 US 
M&A Deals 
Private acquisition positive AR.  
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
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HYPOTHESIS 3 (a) 
The review of previous studies has provided contradicting results, with some scholars 
finding that there are positive returns associated with the M&As while some say there 
are negative returns or insignificant returns. A possible reason for inconclusive results 
might be the fact that the studies did not consider whether the companies that were 
acquired were private or public companies. This hypothesis addresses the third 
objective of determining whether there is a difference in AR when acquiring a private 
company compared to when acquiring a public listed company 
H0: CAARA = CAARB 
The null hypothesis states that the CAAR earned before the listed company 
acquires a non-listed company is equal to the CAAR earned after the mergers 
announcement. 
H1: CAARA > CAARB 
The alternative hypothesis states that CAAR earned after the listed company 
acquires a non-listed company is greater than CAAR earned before merger 
announcements. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (b) 
 
H0: CAARA = CAARB 
The null hypothesis states that the CAAR earned before the listed company 
acquires another listed company is equal to CAAR earned after the mergers 
announcement 
H1: CAARA < CAARB 
The alternative hypothesis states that CAAR earned after the listed company acquires 
another listed company is less than CAAR earned after merger announcements 
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 Conclusion 
The literature review has provided an outline of the empirical studies completed to 
quantify the performance of M&As. The review of previous studies has provided 
contradicting results, with some scholars finding that there are positive returns 
associated with the M&As while some say there are negative returns or insignificant 
returns. The conflicting results might be due to the motives of the M&As or whether a 
private or public company was being acquired. The previous studies only focused on 
the overall returns for acquisitions. In such studies, the returns were not analysed 
further considering shareholder returns of the acquiring company when a listed 
company acquires another listed company or when a listed company acquires a 
private company in South Africa. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is 
no recent research carried out in other countries that focuses on the analysis of the 
returns of the acquiring company when a listed company acquires another listed 
company or when a listed company acquires a private company. Therefore, this study 
will focus on returns obtained by the listed company acquiring another listed company 
or returns earned when a listed company acquires a private company. 
For the studies that were done by Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang (1998) and Capron 
and Shen (2007), it was noted that the findings for acquisitions of private companies 
seems to be showing consistently positive earnings. On the other hand, the 
conclusions for acquisition of public companies has consistently shown negative 
results. This highlights the importance of considering private and public M&As 
separately in South Africa.   
Chapter Three will discuss the research methodology.  
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CHAPTER THREE. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 Introduction 
The primary objective of this research is to determine the impact of M&As on the 
shareholder value of JSE listed acquiring companies. The focus will be on the AR 
obtained when the listed company acquires another listed company compared to the 
AR obtained when a listed company acquires a private company. This study will also 
focus on acquiring companies obtaining control of other companies, irrespective of 
whether the acquired company is listed or non-listed. The literature review provided 
an outline of prior studies that have been carried out in relation to this topic. In terms 
of the neoclassical profit maximisation theory, M&As are expected to increase the 
shareholder value. On the other hand, in terms of the maximising management utility 
theory, M&As are expected to increase the manager’s wealth and may not generate 
returns for the shareholder. In terms of the literature, mixed results were identified. 
Some M&As did bring favourable returns to the stakeholders. Other scholars, 
however, found that their results showed negative returns to the acquiring 
stakeholders. Lastly, some scholars also noted that their findings showed that M&As 
do not bring substantial returns to the shareholders; therefore, they do not add value. 
The literature review showed that when a public company acquires another public 
company, there are negative ARs whereas when a public company acquires a private 
company the ARs are positive.  
This chapter outlines the research methodology that will be used to answer the 
research question that was raised in Chapter One concerning the impact of M&As on 
the shareholder value of the JSE listed acquiring company when acquiring a private 
company compared to acquiring a public company. This chapter begins with outlining 
the data and the data sources in section 3.2. Section 3.2.1 presents the research 
population and the sampling. Section 3.2.2 presents the estimation period and window 
period. Section 3.2.3 presents data types and sources and 3.2.4 presents Indicators 
of value. Section 3.3 outlines the research design. Section 3.3.1 presents the events 
study methodology, section 3.3.2 is the model specification with 3.3.3 presenting data 
presentation and analysis. Section 3.4 identifies the ethical issues. Lastly, section 3.5 
concludes the chapter. 
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 Data and Data Sources 
3.2.1 Research population and sampling 
The population from which the sample was drawn is the Competition Commission 
database (Competition commission,2018). All the M&As have to be approved by the 
Competition Commission before they are finalised. Therefore, all the M&As that have 
been approved in South Africa are included in the Competition Commission database. 
The database was obtained from the Competition Commission website and used to 
extract the M&As that happened from the 2011 financial year up to the 2016 financial 
year. The database contains M&A deals that were approved, pending, and declined. 
For this research a filter was applied to select M&A deals that were approved by the 
Competition Commission. The total population for the number of deals that were 
submitted to the competition commission was 1 827 deals. Of the total number of deals 
submitted, 1 515 were approved.  
The final sample was selected using a purposive sampling method since the final 
sample population was limited in size, so non-probability sampling was used. 
Purposive sampling means that a sample is selected for the exact purpose of the 
research. The criteria for sample selection were based on the following: 
• The companies were involved in M&As from 2011 to 2016. 
• The acquiring entity was listed on the JSE for the above period. 
• The entities completed the M&A deals between 2011 and 2016.  
The final sample totaled to 94 companies involved in M&As that were listed on the 
JSE. Of the 94 acquisitions, 85 were acquisitions of private companies and 9 consisted 
of listed companies acquiring other listed companies. The data included listed as well 
as non-listed companies that were involved in M&A transactions and can be seen in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3. 1: Population and final sample 
Year 
Number of Deals 
Submitted 
Number of Deals 
Approved 
Listed Acquiring 
Companies 
2011 284 235 17 
2012 366 279 19 
2013 330 304 11 
2014 359 289 18 
2015 441 365 19 
2016 47 43 10 
Total 1 827 1 515 94 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction) 
The analysis involved a comparison of the pre-acquisition and the post-acquisition 
results from the 2011 to 2016 financial year ends of JSE listed companies. Baseline 
Scenario (2009) mentioned that South Africa was over the worst recession period and 
Africa was set to be the fastest growing region after Asia. In this study, the period from 
2011 to 2016 was ideal to observe considering it was a post-recession period.  
Baseline Scenario (2009) stated that the recovery of a recession that is linked to a 
financial crisis will take about seven quarters. South Africa was declared to have 
slipped into a technical recession in 2017 after the gross domestic product declined 
during the second quarter of 2017 (Finance24, 2017). For this reason, 2017 and 2018 
were excluded so the focus was from the 2011 to 2016 financial period. The total 
population size was 1 515 companies with approved deals by the Competition 
Commission (2018), as shown in Table 3.1.  
For the final sample selected, the announcement date was validated at the IRESS 
news site for the first ten companies in each year. Due to the large volume of 
transactions, and the validation process being manual, only the first ten were verified. 
The final sample may be found in Appendix A. 
3.2.2 Estimation period and window period  
M&As are usually studied over two different window periods. The first one is classified 
as short term, which at most is two years before and after the M&A, or a shorter period. 
The second one, being classified as long term, is three years or more before and after 
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the M&A (Aggoud & Bourgeois, 2012).  McWilliams and Siegel (1997), however, noted 
that any period longer than 50 days runs a risk of including confounding events and 
they recommended that, for events studies, a maximum period of 50 days should be 
used. For the purpose of this research, a short term window period was utilised to 
scrutinize the movement of the price of a share subsequent to the M&A. This was 
because the short term eliminated the risk of including confounding events. In some 
cases, a company will have multiple acquisitions in one year, and it would be 
impossible to eliminate those transactions. Therefore, a short term window period was 
most suitable. 
When utilising the market model for estimation of expected and AR, the beta and alpha 
coefficient must be estimated during an estimation period which happens before the 
event window (Werner and Mårtensson, 2012). The estimation window period was 
180 trading days ending 20 days prior to the event. Brown and Warner (1985) 
recommended 180 trading days as the window period when analysing stock returns. 
The event window period is demarcated as the time interval that is selected to analyse 
data from the date of announcement of the M&A where “0” represents the 
announcement date. Common window periods are 5, 10 or 20 days and these window 
days have been used by scholars such as Shah and Arora (2014), Reinikainen (2010) 
and Ndlovu (2017). When choosing a window period, it is important to consider that 
an extensive window period makes it difficult to control for confounding effects. Thus, 
the window period should be short enough to eliminate the confounding effects but 
long enough to capture the effects of the events (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
Bruner and Perella (2004) argued that the estimates are more accurate when the 
event window is longer. Therefore, to avoid the limitations that come with choosing a 
single event window, the following event windows were applied for this study with “0” 
being the announcement date: 
• The first window was 3 days (-1, 0, 1), used by Smit and Ward (2007); 
• The second window was 21 days (-10, 0, 10), supported by Viljoen (2014); and 
• The last window period was 41 trading days (-20, 0, 20), supported by Viljoen 
(2014). 
Considering that the emphasis of this study was to scrutinise the short term effect of 
the M&A, window periods of 3, 21 and 41 days were considered adequate. Smit and 
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Ward (2007) applied 3, 11, and 21 days window periods to scrutinise the effect of 
acquisitions on the share price of the acquiring entity. There is a possibility of leakage 
of information few days closer to the announcement of M&As, and this usually reduces 
the trading appetite for investors (Yuce & Ng, 2005). Therefore, 20 days before the 
announcement of the merger is considered enough to cover the risk of information 
leakage. 
3.2.3 Data types and sources 
Data collection is defined as the process of collecting and gathering information that 
is essential for the study that is conducted (Mitchell, 2014). This study used secondary 
data that were obtained mainly from electronic databases such as the IRESS 
database, the Competition Commission, and the JSE. Vijoen (2014) recommended 
the use of secondary data because it provides access to larger datasets that will 
enable testing of the cause and effect relationship. Secondary data are defined as 
data that are readily available from other sources, such as financial information from 
the IRESS database. Secondary data have already been collected.  
The following sources were utilised for this research: 
• The Competition Commission database was used to identify M&As that were 
approved from 2011 to 2016. The Competition Commission is a statutory body that 
has been empowered to endorse M&As that promote equity and efficiency in the 
South African economy (Competition Commission, 2018). 
• The JSE site was used to identify the announcement date of the M&A. The JSE 
offers efficient, secure primary and secondary capital markets over the diverse 
range of securities (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2018). 
• The IRESS database was utilised to obtain share price information for the 
companies listed on the JSE. The IRESS considers their database to be a reliable 
and trusted database for stock market, financial sector news, and corporate market 
news. IRESS provides financial data feeds and analysis tools (IRESS, 2018). 
3.2.4 Indicators of value 
According to Gurr (2018), there are two main indicators of value that can be used as 
a measurement of comparison to determine whether the value has been created or 
not for stakeholders of the acquiring entity. There are internal indicators that are also 
 
30 
 
classified as accounting measures such as return on assets, return on equity and 
return on capital. According to Rashid and Naeem (2017), the long term effects of 
M&As are analysed using the internal indicators such as profitability ratios, leverage, 
and liquidity ratios, to determine any improvement in the financial performance. 
Therefore, internal indicators tie into long run measurement.  
There are also external indicators that include examining the share price of the 
company and intrinsic value (Gurr, 2018). The external indicators refer to Technical 
analysis tools that are used to measure changes in securities within a specific market. 
External indicators can be used either for long term or short term measurement. For 
this research, the short term was analysed using the external indicator of share price. 
 Research Design 
3.3.1 Event study methodology 
The EVM was developed to measure the impact or effect of an anticipated event such 
as in the case of M&As (McWilliams and Siegel,1997). Shah and Arora (2014) 
recommended the use of event study when analysing the impact of the share prices 
on the acquiring company before and after the M&A, to measure whether the AR was 
positive or negative. Similar to Dilshad (2013), Viljoen (2014), and Ficici (2018), the 
EVM was used to analyse the impact on the share price performance in relation to the 
announcement of a M&A transaction.  
The first objective of the study is to analyse the share price of the acquiring company, 
by paying attention to the pre- and post-announcement of the M&A. The second 
objective is analysing AR when a public entity buys another public entity compared to 
the AR earned when a public entity buys a private entity. The aim is to analyse if there 
is any value being added for the stakeholders of the acquiring company. The EVM 
scrutinises the differences amongst the returns that are anticipated when there is no 
event (normal returns) and the returns that are caused by an event as in the case of 
M&As (AR) (Event Study Tools, 2018). It therefore allows the researcher to verify any 
AR on the share price because of an event. An event study scrutinises the market’s 
response to an event or transaction through the observation of share prices around 
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the particular event (Peterson, 1989). Viljoen (2014) also supported the use of EVM 
to analyse the impact of M&As on shareholders’ value of the acquiring company.  
There are certain assumptions that must be applicable for the EVM to measure the 
realistic financial impact of an event (Event Study Tools, 2018). These are: 
• Capital markets or share prices must replicate the available information about the 
company precisely and adjust instantly to the public issue of new data, that is, it 
presumes that the markets are efficient; 
• The event is unexpected. The market only becomes aware of the event 
immediately after the announcement of the event; and 
• There is an expectation that other events will be isolated from the transaction that 
is being analysed, that is, there will be no confounding effects.  
Confounding events can be defined as those events that have the potential to 
influence the share price of a company. The confounding events that might have an 
impact on the study are: 
• Declarations of interim or final dividends; 
• Changes in key management; 
• Obtaining a major contract; and 
• Filing of lawsuits that may damage the reputation of the company. 
If such events are not managed well, they might have an impact on the share price 
during the window period (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
3.3.2 Model specification 
According to Brown and Warner (1985), there are different models that are used to 
estimate the expected returns. These models include: 
• Market model; 
• Market-adjusted model;  
• Market and risk adjusted returns model; and 
• Market model with Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) and Error Estimation Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedastic (EGARCH).  
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Brown and Warner (1985) have used the market model when measuring the security 
price performance and have mentioned that the market adjusted model assumes that 
the expected returns are equal to all the securities. The market and risk adjusted 
returns assume that the Capital Asset Pricing Model generates returns, which is not 
necessarily the case. Lastly, the market model with GARCH and EGARCH error 
estimation models work best when used with time series data. Thus, the market 
adjusted model, market and risk adjusted returns model, and market model with 
GARCH and EGARCH are not suitable for this type of research. 
Corhay and Rad (1996) advocated using the market model when investigating the 
impact of an event on the shareholders’ wealth or when testing market efficiency.  The 
model has also been advocated by Sorokina, Booth and Thornton (2013) as one of 
the prominent models when calculating the AR. Cable and Holland (1999), however, 
criticised the model on the basis that it assumes that, on average, all the shares will 
generate the same return as the market. This is not a fair assumption as shares react 
differently for different companies.  
Rahman et al. (2018) stated that the market model is the standard method for 
examining the impact of events. According to Events Study Tools (2018), this method 
uses share price data to examine the returns on the event transactions by observing 
the market reaction of whether there is an increase or decrease in the share price of 
a company after the occurrence of the M&A event. The reaction of the market is 
measured in the form of AR which is calculated as the difference between actual 
returns and the expected returns of the share price after the M&A. The AR and 
cumulative AR of the share price are used to measure the impact of M&A events 
before and after the M&A (Events Study Tools, 2018). 
In the context of this study, the market model was used as it makes use of actual 
market returns and the information was easily available. Ward and Muller (2010) 
mentioned that the disadvantage of the market model is that it assumes that the beta 
for the risk-free rate is constant which conflicts with the assumption that the market 
returns vary over time. The advantage of the market model is that it accounts for 
expected returns for individual companies, and it uses information that is easily 
available compared to the other models, therefore it is the preferred model.  
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3.3.3 Data presentation and analysis of normal and abnormal returns 
The information for the share price as well as market returns was downloaded from 
the IRESS database for all the companies selected in the sample. The announcement 
date was identified as the date the M&As were finalised from the Competition 
Commission database for the first objective and hypothesis focusing on the share price 
movement of the acquiring company for any abnormal return (AR) earned after the 
M&A, and the second objective and hypothesis focusing on differences between 
returns earned before the M&A and returns earned after the M&A. The following 
process was then followed: 
1. The historical share prices were used to estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression (Market returns and share price returns estimates, Ri and Rm) using 
Equation 1 below. 
2. The market returns were then used to estimate the expected return (ER) using 
Equation 2 below. 
3. Abnormal returns were calculated using the difference between share price return 
and the expected return (AR) using Equation 3 below. 
4. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) were calculated based on the event 
date using Equation 4. 
5. After the computation of CAAR, a t test was performed to analyse any significant 
returns obtained after the M&A. 
The market model started with the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as shown 
in equation 1 which is the return of the market (Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE) / JSE / All Share Index (ALSI) and specific return of the company: 
E(Rit)= αi + βiRmt       (1) 
Where: 
Rit = the rate of return on company i on day t 
Rmt = the rate of return on a market portfolio of shares (ASPI) on 
day t. 
αi = the intercept term (alpha) 
βi = the systematic risk of share i (beta) 
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After the estimation of the return of a company’s share price as well as the market 
return, the next step was to calculate the expected return. Following Smith and Ward 
(2007), the abnormal returns were calculated using equation 2: 
ARit = Rit – (αi + βiRmt)       (2) 
Where: 
Rit = the rate of return on company i on day t 
ARit = abnormal returns of the firm i during the event period  
Rmt = the rate of return on a market portfolio of shares (ASPI) on 
day t. 
αi = the intercept term (alpha) 
βi = the systematic risk of share i (beta) 
The study used the average abnormal returns (AAR) to assess securities under 
consideration. The AARs were calculated for each day by averaging the abnormal 
returns (ARs) for the whole sample on that day. 
Following this, the CAAR was constructed to determine the accumulated impact 
(Reinikainen, 2010), 
CAAR (t1,t2) = ∑ 𝐀𝐀𝐑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 t
      (3) 
Where: 
CAAR = Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
AAR = the average abnormal returns 
t = -20 to 20 
Following Reinikainen (2010), a t test at the 5% significance level was used to test the 
level of significance. The t-statistic was constructed using the following formulae for 
AAR and CAAR respectively: 
t-statistic = AARt / σ (AARt)            (4) 
Where: 
AARt = the Average Abnormal Return at day t 
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σ (AARt)= the standard error of average abnormal return 
And: 
                               t-statistic = CAARt / σ (CAARt)    (5) 
Where: 
CAARt = the day t cumulative average abnormal return 
σ (CAARt) = the standard error of cumulative average abnormal 
error 
3.3.4 Analysis of private and public companies’ acquisitions. 
To test the third hypothesis, aligned to the third objective of determining whether there 
is a difference in AR when acquiring a private company compared to when acquiring 
a public listed company, the sample was split into two groups. The first group was the 
JSE listed company acquiring another JSE listed company (n=9). The second group 
was the JSE listed company acquiring a private company (n=85). The same 
procedures from step two to step five were then followed to test hypotheses 3(a) and 
(b) as stated in section 3.2.1 
Descriptive statistics were used to show the profile characteristics of the selected 
sample and were therefore used to describe features of the data used in this study. 
For inferential analysis a t test was applied to test for any statistical significance in the 
difference between the CAAR mean earned before and the CAAR mean earned after 
the M&A, and to compare listed and unlisted companies.  
 Ethical issues 
As this research did not involve humans or animals and used information from 
databases available in the public domain, the ethical clearance application was 
classified as ‘no risk’. Full ethical clearance was granted, with the certificate number 
HSS/1069/018M. A copy of the certificate may be found in Appendix B. 
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 Chapter summary 
This chapter has detailed the methodological approach that was used to analyse the 
impact of M&As on the shareholder value of the JSE listed acquiring company. The 
chapter highlighted the population and the sample, as well as the justification for the 
period. The chapter further detailed the methodology that was selected, as well as the 
data types and sources of data. The market model was used to calculate the AR where 
ordinary least squares were used to estimate return on the share price as well as the 
return on the market, and AARs were calculated. The sample was drawn from the 
Competition Commission database while the IRESS database was used to extract the 
share price information. 
 Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of the results. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 
 
 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to identify the impact of M&As on the shareholder value of JSE 
listed acquiring companies when acquiring private non-listed companies compared to 
acquiring public listed companies. Chapter Three detailed the methodology that was 
used to address this aim, and this chapter presents the findings of the study.  
This chapter will present the findings for CAARs and descriptive statistics. Section 4.1 
presents descriptive statistics for the sample, followed by section 4.2 which presents 
CAARs for the whole sample as well as descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 presents the 
difference between pre-announcement returns and post announcement returns, and 
section 4.4 analyses the results for the acquisition of private non-listed companies 
compared to acquisitions of public listed companies. Lastly, section 4.5 presents the 
chapter summary.  
 Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample may be found in Appendix A. The sample comprised of 94 listed 
entities that were involved in M&As from 2011 to 2016, of which 85 were acquisitions 
of private companies and 9 were acquisitions of listed companies. A summary of the 
descriptive statistics for the individual JSE sectors and in total is presented in Table 
4.1 overleaf.  
The 2011 year had 17 M&As and the dominating sector was industrials with 7 M&As 
followed by finance with 6 M&As, and an average market capital of R32.36 billion. The 
2012 year had 19 acquisitions with finance as the dominating sector attaining 9 M&As 
followed by consumer goods with 4 acquisitions having an average market capital of 
R29.42 billion. The 2013 year had 11 M&As with industrials being the dominating 
sector and the average market capital for 2013 was R23.35 billion. 2014 had 18 
acquisitions with finance as the dominating sector obtaining 9 M&As and an average 
market share of R32.46 billion. The M&As industry experienced the highest peak on 
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Table 4. 1: Summary of descriptive statistics for sectors (n=94) 
 Average market capitalization 
(R ‘million) 
Median 
(R’million) 
Std. Dev 
(R’million) 
JSE Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average per 
sector 
  
Basic Materials 
R86 914 R11 453 R532 R1 209 R2 001 R3 550 R15 693  
(8 private, 1 public) 
R3 471  
 
R28 007 
Consumer Goods 
R36 826 R12 077 R79 065 R25 642 R50 228 R3 342 R43 693  
(10 private, 0 
public) 
R31 234 R36 752 
Consumer Services 
R10 465 R27 483 R53 300 R7 842 R44 366 R10 543 R23 657  
(7 private, 0 public) 
R16 783 R24 631 
Financials  
R60 521 R13 538 R3 651 R11 527 R31 437 R26 857 R24 880  
(35 private, 5 
public) 
R10 075 R34 176 
Health Care 
R1 877 R1 732 R1 654 R1 754 R2 432 R2 321 R2 432  
(1 private, 0 public) 
R2 432 R2 432 
Industrials   
R6 057 R8 176 R24 727 R26 042 R30 286 R61 246 R24 726  
(20 private, 3 
public) 
R8 513 R36 944 
Oil and Gas 
R248 300 R189 354 R282 354 R234 587 R255 543 R252 547 R248 300  
(1 private, 0 public) 
R248 300 R248 300 
Technology 
R7 137 R6 952 R6 986 R4 976 R5 987 R6 876 R9 440  
(1 private, 0 public) 
R9 440 R9 440 
Telecommunications 
R89 465 R92 573 R91 543 R120 344 R133 526 R124 766 R131 616  
(2 private, 0 public) 
131 616 R134 579 
Average per 
annum 
R 32 364  
(15 
private, 2 
public) 
R 29 420 
(18 
private, 1 
public) 
R 23 356  
(10 
private, 1 
public) 
R 32 464  
(16 
private, 2 
public) 
R30 462  
(17 
private, 2 
public) 
R22 662 
(17 
private, 1 
public) 
R30 332  
(85 private, 9 
public 
R 12 511  R 45 376  
- Private R13 366 R32 271 R14 020 R31 401 R 23 061 R23 662 R 25 451 R 11 035  R 39 896  
- Public R51 307 R7 476 R116 683 R50 013 R116 019 R50 013 R 70 872 R 36 826  R 71 584  
(Source: Researcher’s compilation) 
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M&As in 2015. This was also evidenced in acquisitions as 2015 had 20 M&As and this 
was the highest of all the financial years from 2011 to 2016. The average market 
capital was R30.46 billion. This is attributable to the economy showing good signs of 
recovery from the 2008 great recession (Statista: The Statistics Portal, 2018). Lastly, 
2016 had only 10 M&As with an average market capital of R22.66 billion. 
 
Table 4.1 above shows the total average market capital of R30.33 billion with a median 
of R12.5 billion and a standard deviation of R45.37 billion. Average market capital for 
non-listed is R25.45 billion with a median of R11.03 billion and a standard deviation of 
R39.89. Lastly, the average market capital for listed companies is R70.87 billion with 
a median of R36.82 billion and a standard deviation of R71.58 billion. 
 
 Performance of mergers and acquisitions in general 
4.3.1 Cumulative average abnormal returns 
The final sample comprised 94 listed entities that were involved in M&As from 2011 to 
2016, of which 85 were acquisitions of private companies and 9 were acquisitions of 
listed companies. EVM using the market model was used to calculate the expected 
returns. The expected returns (ERs) were then used to compute the AR which were 
calculated by subtracting the expected returns from the actual returns. The AARs were 
calculated for each day by averaging the ARs for the whole sample on that day. The 
CAARs were calculated using the AARs which were computed using the market 
model.  
Table 4.2 overleaf shows the AAR, CAAR and CAAR t test as well as the significance 
level (p-value) for CAAR for the 41 days window period for the performance of mergers 
in general. The 41 days window period covered the two other window periods which 
were 3 days and 21 days. The results showed that there are no significant returns for 
CAAR for the whole 41 days window period as all p-values were greater than 0.05. 
This study’s first and second hypotheses aimed at testing whether the acquisition of a 
new company added value to the shareholders of the acquiring company. This 
included analysing and comparing the pre-M&A announcement returns with the post 
announcement returns to determine whether there were any significant differences. 
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Table 4. 2: Total sample over event window period 
Event Window Days AAR CAAR CAAR t test CAAR p-value 
-20 0.3315% 0.3315% 0.1738 0.4315 
-19 0.2461% 0.5776% 0.3456 0.3654 
-18 -0.0686% 0.5090% 0.3343 0.3696 
-17 0.4038% 0.9128% 0.5891 0.2786 
-16 -0.0499% 0.8629% 0.5522 0.2911 
-15 0.2365% 1.0993% 0.6068 0.2730 
-14 -0.0367% 1.0626% 0.5856 0.2800 
-13 0.0338% 1.0964% 0.4502 0.3269 
-12 -0.1035% 0.9930% 0.4443 0.3290 
-11 0.3151% 1.3080% 0.5167 0.3035 
-10 0.1479% 1.4559% 0.6609 0.2554 
-9 -0.1062% 1.3497% 0.5634 0.2874 
-8 -0.1700% 1.1797% 0.4164 0.3392 
-7 -0.0440% 1.1357% 0.4334 0.3330 
-6 -0.3668% 0.7689% 0.1960 0.4225 
-5 -0.1236% 0.6453% 0.1042 0.4587 
-4 -0.4822% 0.1631% -0.0421 0.4841 
-3 0.5488% 0.7118% 0.2209 0.4132 
-2 -0.4192% 0.2926% -0.0855 0.4682 
-1 -0.1103% 0.1823% -0.2281 0.4132 
0 0.5844% 0.7667% 0.1030 0.4591 
1 0.2809% 0.2809% 0.1312 0.4480 
2 0.2665% 0.5474% 0.2971 0.3836 
3 -0.0477% 0.4997% 0.4554 0.3251 
4 0.2095% 0.7092% 0.5813 0.2813 
5 0.1555% 0.8647% 0.5713 0.2847 
6 0.2300% 1.0947% 0.7310 0.2333 
7 -0.1831% 0.9116% 0.5941 0.2770 
8 0.1278% 1.0395% 0.6498 0.2590 
9 -0.1230% 0.9164% 0.5183 0.3028 
10 0.0690% 0.9854% 0.5747 0.2837 
11 -0.1658% 0.8197% 0.5281 0.2994 
12 0.0516% 0.8712% 0.5066 0.3070 
13 0.0685% 0.9398% 0.5887 0.2790 
14 0.3713% 1.3111% 0.7782 0.2193 
15 -0.3024% 1.0087% 0.7015 0.2425 
16 -0.0524% 0.9563% 0.5958 0.2766 
17 0.4030% 1.3592% 0.8470 0.1996 
18 -0.0442% 1.3150% 0.7965 0.2140 
19 -0.3773% 0.9377% 0.6230 0.2674 
20 -0.8139% 0.1237% 0.0994 0.4607 
 (Source: Researcher’s compilation) 
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The non-significant t tests in Table 4.2 show that CAARs did not differ significantly 
from zero. This implies that the market was either skeptical towards M&As because of 
the risks that are associated with the transactions, or they might not see any value in 
the M&As. Therefore, no value was created for the shareholders of the acquiring 
companies through these acquisitions. The results are similar to other studies such as 
those of Shah and Arora (2014) and Ndlovu (2017).   
These findings showing the trend for the 41 days window period are illustrated 
graphically in Figure 4.1 overleaf. The results depicted in Figure 4.1 indicate that 
CAARs had an upward trend for the acquiring company before the announcement 
date with the results dropping 10 days before the announcement day. The returns 
were positive after the announcement and peaked at about 6 days, 14 days, as well 
as 17 days after the announcement. This means that the market saw value in M&As 
after the announcement of the M&A. The findings from Table 4.2 indicate that although 
there were positive returns after the M&As, the returns were not significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, the M&As did not create value for the acquiring companies. 
 
Figure 4. 1: Cumulative average abnormal returns for acquiring companies 41 
days window period. 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction) 
The graphic illustration in Figure 4.1 together with the findings from Table 4.2 indicate 
that although there were positive returns after the M&As, the returns were not 
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significantly different from zero. Therefore, the M&As did not create value for the 
acquiring companies. These findings are consistent with the findings from the other 
studies such as that of Ndlovu (2017) who concluded that the announcement of the 
M&A does not create value for the shareholders of the acquiring company. Similarly, 
Viljoen (2014) did not find any significant returns for the shareholders of the acquiring 
company. Therefore, this research retains the first null hypothesis that stated that 
merger and acquisitions announcements do not affect shareholder value for the 
acquiring company. 
4.3.2 Difference between pre-announcement and post-announcement returns 
CAAR 
The second hypothesis was tested by comparing the pre-announcement returns with 
the post announcement returns. According to Viljoen (2014), companies embark on 
M&As with the aim of increasing returns to their shareholders. Therefore, the 
expectation was that the returns earned after the M&A announcements would be 
higher than the returns before the M&A announcements.  
A t test was calculated to test the difference between the pre- and post-CAAR and the 
results are shown on the Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4. 3: Sample statistics for three window periods comparing before and 
after the announcement of the mergers 
Event 
Window 
CAAR Mean 
before 
CAAR Mean 
after 
t test p-value 
Is the CAAR 
statistically 
significant? 
3 Days 0.4745% 0.4142% 0.3797 0.3845 No 
21 Days 0.7885% 0.7850% 0.0157 0.4939 No 
41 Days 0.8319% 0.8746% -0.4628 0.3244 No 
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
Table 4.3 shows sample statistics for the three window periods. The t test was 
calculated to test the difference between the pre and post CAAR mean for all the three 
event window periods. 
The paired sample t test was calculated to do a comparison of the mean CAAR earned 
before the announcement of the M&A to the CAAR mean earned after the M&A for the 
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3 days, 21 days and 41 days window periods. Although the pre-announcement returns 
were different to the post announcement returns, they were not significantly different 
as all p-values exceeded 0.05. Therefore, there was no value for shareholders of the 
acquiring company after the announcement of the M&A 
The CAAR was not significant at any window period and this shows that there was no 
significant difference between the pre- and post-announcement returns. Although the 
CAARs were positive, they were not significant. The M&A announcements did not add 
any additional value for the shareholders as the returns were not significant. This is in 
line with the findings of Corhay and Rad (1996) and Ndlovu (2017). These findings 
support the maximizing management utility theory which suggests that managers will 
sometimes attempt to maximise their own interests. These interests do not necessarily 
correspond with maximisation of the shareholder’s wealth. Therefore, the second null 
hypothesis that states that the CAAR earned after the M&A announcement is not 
significantly greater than the CAAR earned before the M&A announcement is retained. 
 Performance of acquirers when acquiring a private company 
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for all three window periods for AAR and CAAR 
for the acquisitions of private companies from 2011 to 2016. The majority of 
acquisitions were acquisitions of private companies as they comprised 85 out of the 
total 94 acquisitions.  
Table 4. 4: Descriptive statistics for AAR and CAAR non-listed companies  
 41 DAYS 
  AAR  CAAR t test  p-value 
Mean 0.0473% 0.6955% 0.4960 0.1986 
Median -0.0748% 0.4947%    
Standard Deviation 0.8986% 3.0740%    
Variance 0.0081% 0.0945%    
Minimum -1.8833% -5.1827%    
Maximum 2.2239% 5.3783%    
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics of AARs, CAARs, and t test for 
acquisitions of private companies not listed on the JSE. The mean for CAAR is 
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0,6955%. This implies that most of the companies had cumulative AARs less than 
zero. This was also evident in the median of 0,4947%. The CAAR variance was 
0,0945%, meaning that the share price movement was minimal. Overall, the market 
did not react to the announcements of M&As. T test results were insignificant, which 
means that the shareholders of the acquiring company did not get any significant 
returns. The results for all non-listed companies are presented in Table 4.5 overleaf. 
The AARs and CAAR before the announcements of the M&As showed mixed results. 
The CAAR constantly showed negative returns with a mean CAAR of -2.0269% for 
the 20 days window period before the merger announcement. The p-value was only 
significant for days -12, -5, -4 and -1 before the M&As when tested for significance at 
the 5% level of significance before the announcement of the M&As. There is a 
possibility of information leakage about the M&As that made investors sceptical of 
trading before the announcement of the M&As. There is always an increased risk 
associated with acquiring a private company (Yuce & Ng, 2005). The returns earned 
before the announcement of the M&A of the private companies showed negative 
returns and this is in line with the findings from Yuce and Ng (2005).   
The AARs and CAAR after the announcements of the M&As consistently showed 
positive results. The CAAR constantly showed positive returns with a mean CAAR of 
3.5292% and p-value of 0.0001 after the merger announcement. The findings from 
Table 4.5 indicate that there were significant positive returns from day 6 after the 
M&As. Therefore, the M&As did create value for the acquiring companies. These 
findings are consistent the findings from the other studies such as Capron and Shen 
(2007) and Corhay and Rad (1996) who concluded that the announcement of the 
M&As create value for shareholders of the acquiring company as the returns are 
significant.  
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Table 4. 5: Total sample over event window period for acquisitions of private 
companies 
Event Window Days AAR CAR CAAR t test 
CAAR p-
value 
Significant 
-20 0.3866% 0.4947% 0.0996 0.4604 No 
-19 -0.0991% 0.3463% 0.1684 0.4333 No 
-18 -1.2108% -0.8275% -0.4979 0.3101 No 
-17 0.1682% -0.6966% -0.2527 0.4007 No 
-16 -0.7475% -1.3836% -0.3862 0.3501 No 
-15 1.0186% -0.4891% -0.0266 0.4896 No 
-14 -0.9219% -1.5407% -0.7672 0.2225 No 
-13 -0.7593% -2.3012% -1.5879 0.0579 No 
-12 -0.9232% -3.1317% -1.9195 0.0290 Yes 
-11 0.9212% -2.3369% -1.4163 0.0800 No 
-10 -0.0406% -2.3986% -1.4657 0.0731 No 
-9 0.2947% -1.8743% -1.2445 0.1083 No 
-8 -0.0748% -2.0513% -1.2570 0.1059 No 
-7 0.7152% -1.3611% -0.7722 0.2210 No 
-6 -1.7087% -2.9000% -1.4477 0.0756 No 
-5 -0.2188% -3.0686% -1.6668 0.0495 Yes 
-4 -1.8833% -5.1827% -2.5167 0.0067 Yes 
-3 2.2239% -2.8797% -1.4271 0.0784 No 
-2 -0.3918% -3.3935% -1.5226 0.0657 No 
-1 -0.3578% -3.5621% -1.6792 0.0482 Yes 
0 2.1261% -1.5294% -0.7059 0.2412  
1 1.0451% 0.9918% 0.4486 0.3273 No 
2 0.4448% 1.3685% 0.7844 0.2173 No 
3 0.9370% 2.1974% 1.1763 0.1212 No 
4 0.1080% 2.3549% 1.3247 0.0942 No 
5 -0.1426% 2.1848% 1.2137 0.1139 No 
6 1.3532% 3.4351% 1.8754 0.0319 Yes 
7 -0.5601% 3.0138% 1.7216 0.0442 Yes 
8 1.1683% 4.0794% 2.4224 0.0086 Yes 
9 0.2533% 4.3489% 2.5865 0.0056 Yes 
10 -0.0773% 4.2831% 2.5138 0.0068 Yes 
11 -0.3998% 3.8699% 2.2870 0.0122 Yes 
12 0.3481% 4.1725% 2.4537 0.0080 Yes 
13 0.0992% 4.2643% 2.4614 0.0078 Yes 
14 0.6976% 4.9129% 3.0654 0.0014 Yes 
15 -0.4490% 4.4648% 2.7890 0.0032 Yes 
16 0.9172% 5.3783% 3.3738 0.0005 Yes 
17 -0.7618% 4.6282% 3.1167 0.0121 Yes 
18 -0.3747% 4.2752% 2.7052 0.0040 Yes 
19 -0.8415% 3.3556% 2.2253 0.0142 Yes 
20 -0.3434% 3.0043% 2.0810 0.0200 Yes 
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Figure 4. 2:  AAR and CAAR 41 days window period for non-listed companies 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction) 
Table 4.6 shows sample statistics for the three window periods. The t test was 
calculated to test the difference between the pre and post CAAR mean for all the 3 
events window periods. 
Table 4. 6: Sample statistics for the three window periods comparing before 
and after the announcement for non-listed companies 
Event 
Window 
CAAR Mean 
before 
CAAR Mean 
after 
t test p-value 
Is the CAAR 
statistically 
Significant 
3 Days -3.4778% 1.1801% -22.5741 0.0141 Yes 
21 Days -2.8672% 2.8258% -11.2035 0.0001 Yes 
41 Days -2.0269% 3.5292% -13.5171 0.0001 Yes 
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
The paired sample t test was calculated to carry out a comparison of the CAAR mean 
earned before the announcement of the M&A to the CAAR mean earned after the 
announcement of the M&A. There was a significant difference between the CAAR 
mean earned before the M&A announcement and the CAAR mean earned after the 
M&A announcement for the 3 days window (p=0.0141), the 21 days window 
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(p=0.0001), and the 41 days window (p=0.0001) periods. The comparison of CAAR 
earned before the merger and CAAR earned after the merger shows a p-value that is 
significant for all window periods. Therefore, the positive market reaction to the M&A 
did create value for the shareholders of the acquiring company. 
Overall, the acquisitions of private companies brought significant positive returns for 
the shareholders of the acquiring company. The findings support neo-classical profit 
maximisation theory which states that companies will generally participate in M&As if 
shareholders’ wealth in the acquiring company will be created. Thus, this study rejects 
the null hypothesis for hypothesis 3(a) and accepts the alternate hypothesis that states 
that CAAR earned after the listed company acquires a non-listed company is greater 
than CAAR earned before merger announcements. 
 Performance of acquirer when acquiring public company  
Table 4.7 shows descriptive statistics for all three window periods for AAR and CAAR 
for the acquisitions of public listed companies for the 41-day window period of 
companies listed on the JSE. Out of the total 94 acquisitions, only 9 were acquisitions 
of listed companies. 
Table 4. 7: Descriptive statistics AAR and CAAR listed companies for 41 days 
window (n=9) 
  41 DAYS  
  AAR CAAR t test CAAR p-value 
Mean -0,0098% 0,3875% 0,1111 0.5178 
Median 0,0222% 0,0017%    
Standard Deviation 0,4683% 1,9970%    
Variance 0,0022% 0,0399%    
Minimum -0,9339% -2,6292%    
Maximum 0,9108% 3,6182%    
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
The CAAR mean was 0.3875. This implies that most of the companies had CAAR 
close to zero. The variance was 0.0399 which means that the share price movement 
was minimal. The t tests for the 41-day window periods were insignificant (p>0.05), 
showing that the means did not differ significantly from zero. Overall, therefore, the 
market did not react to the announcements of M&As of listed firms. This is in line with 
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the findings of Chang (1998). These findings also support the maximising 
management utility theory which suggests that managers will sometimes attempt to 
maximise their own interests. These interests do not necessarily correspond to 
maximisation of the shareholders’ wealth. The results for all listed companies are 
presented in Table 4.8 overleaf. 
These findings are represented graphically in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4. 3:  AARs and CAAR 41 days window period listed companies 
(Source: Researcher’s own construction) 
The findings from Table 4.8 and figure 4.3 indicate that there were no significant 
positive returns after the M&As. Therefore, the M&As did not create value for the 
acquiring companies. These findings are consistent with the findings from the other 
studies such as Capron and Shen (2007) and Conn et al. (2005) who concluded that 
the announcement of the M&As does not create value for shareholders of the acquiring 
company as the returns are not significant. This is because public companies are 
affected by the separation of ownership and control, thus they incur agency costs 
whereas private companies are usually owned by managers, thus avoiding agency 
costs (Golubov & Xiong, 2018). 
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Table 4. 8: Total sample over event window period for listed companies 
Event Window Days AAR CAAR CAAR t test CAAR p-value 
-20 0.0737% 0.0017% 0.1074 0.4573 
-19 0.3122% 0.3467% 0.2334 0.4079 
-18 0.7386% 1.0606% 0.6662 0.2534 
-17 0.2917% 1.3772% 0.7576 0.2253 
-16 0.4484% 1.7853% 0.8097 0.2100 
-15 -0.4426% 1.4254% 0.6246 0.2668 
-14 0.5779% 2.0897% 1.0971 0.1377 
-13 0.5400% 2.6306% 1.5088 0.0673 
-12 0.5120% 3.0808% 1.7239 0.0440 
-11 -0.2990% 2.8660% 1.4609 0.0737 
-10 0.1749% 3.0550% 1.6380 0.0524 
-9 -0.3027% 2.5992% 1.3930 0.0834 
-8 -0.1201% 2.5472% 1.2544 0.1064 
-7 -0.5208% 2.0431% 0.9482 0.1727 
-6 0.7723% 2.7022% 1.1611 0.1242 
-5 0.0222% 2.6910% 1.2154 0.1136 
-4 0.7734% 3.6182% 1.6358 0.0526 
-3 -0.9339% 2.6316% 1.1724 0.1220 
-2 -0.1580% 2.5550% 0.9296 0.1774 
-1 0.1283% 2.5571% 0.8914 0.1875 
0 -0.8330% 1.7863% 0.5736 0.2838 
1 -0.4158% -0.3803% -0.1679 0.4338 
2 -0.0300% -0.3649% -0.2258 0.4112 
3 -0.6724% -0.9652% -0.3288 0.3718 
4 0.1375% -0.8607% -0.3018 0.3820 
5 0.2506% -0.5918% -0.2378 0.4065 
6 -0.6721% -1.1954% -0.5193 0.3024 
7 0.1903% -1.0975% -0.5536 0.2907 
8 -0.6511% -1.6802% -0.9651 0.1685 
9 -0.2919% -1.9828% -1.2060 0.1154 
10 0.1205% -1.8699% -1.1011 0.1368 
11 0.1008% -1.7602% -0.9966 0.1609 
12 -0.1805% -1.9104% -1.1291 0.1309 
13 0.0024% -1.9031% -1.0522 0.1477 
14 -0.0938% -1.9642% -1.2654 0.1045 
15 -0.0031% -1.9679% -1.1579 0.1251 
16 -0.6638% -2.6292% -1.6533 0.0508 
17 0.9108% -1.7262% -1.2308 0.1109 
18 0.2056% -1.5351% -1.0070 0.1582 
19 0.1837% -1.2994% -0.8605 0.1960 
20 -0.5850% -1.8791% -1.2880 0.1004 
 
Table 4.9 overleaf presents the sample statistics for the 3-days window period. 
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Table 4. 9: Sample statistics for three window periods compared before and 
after the announcement for listed companies 
Event 
Window 
CAAR Mean 
before 
CAAR 
Mean after 
t test p-value 
Is the CAAR 
statistically Significant 
3 Days 2.5560% -0.3726% 376.7936 0.0008 Yes 
21 Days 2.6999% -1.0989% 16.8213 0.0001 Yes 
41 Days 2.1832% -1.4782% 14.7359 0.0001 Yes 
(Source: Researcher’s own compilation) 
Table 4.9 shows sample statistics for the three window periods. The t test was 
calculated to test the difference between the pre and post CAAR mean for all the three 
events window periods. The paired sample t test was calculated to carry out a 
comparison of CAAR mean earned before the announcement of the M&A with CAAR 
mean earned after the announcement of the M&A. The difference for the 3-days 
window was significant (p=0.0008), as was the 21-days window (p=0.0001) and the 
41-days window (p=0.0001) periods. The CAAR mean earned after the M&A was 
announced was consistently negative for all three window periods and this difference 
was significant. The shareholders of the acquiring company did not get any returns 
after the announcement of the M&A. Therefore, the M&A announcement did not create 
value for the shareholders of the acquiring company. 
Overall, the acquisitions of public companies did not bring returns for the shareholders 
of the acquiring company.  
These findings are aligned with the findings by Capron and Shen (2007) and Conn et 
al. (2005), who concluded that the acquisitions of public companies does not bring 
positive returns for the shareholders. This is because public companies are affected 
by the separation of ownership and control, thus they incur agency costs whereas 
private companies are usually owned by managers, thus avoiding agency costs 
(Golubov & Xiong, 2018). This means that the third null hypothesis, that the CAAR 
earned before the listed company acquires another listed company remains the same 
after the mergers announcement, is retained. 
Figure 4.4 below shows CAAR for listed companies and CAAR for non-listed 
companies over the 41 days window period. 
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Figure 4. 4: CAAR 41 days window period for listed and non-listed companies 
(Source: Researcher’s own construct) 
Figure 4.4 shows that CAAR for listed companies was showing positive returns for the 
period constantly before the announcements of the M&As. The period after the 
announcements of the mergers showed negative CAAR constantly for acquisitions of 
listed companies. The CAAR for acquisitions of private companies showed negative 
returns constantly before the announcements of M&As. After the announcement of the 
M&As, the acquisitions of private companies showed positive CAAR. 
 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the findings of the study. The results analysing the share 
movement for AARs show that the AAR movement did not differ significantly. This 
means that the market did not respond positively to the announcement of the M&As. 
Similarly, Ndlovu (2017) also concluded that overall, the market did not respond to the 
announcement of mergers and acquisitions. The CAARs were also not significant for 
the overall results. The CAARs were positive after the announcement of the M&As, 
but they were not significantly different, therefore there was no additional value being 
added for the shareholders of the JSE listed acquiring companies. These outcomes 
were similar to the findings from the other studies such as Ndlovu (2017) and Viljoen 
(2014). This supports the first null hypothesis that states that M&A announcements do 
not affect or increase shareholder value for the acquiring company. 
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The analysis of the pre-announcement and post-announcement returns showed AAR 
and CAAR before and after the announcement of the M&A. The analysis indicated that 
the M&As do not bring significant returns to the shareholders, therefore no value was 
added for the shareholders. This supports the second null hypothesis that states that 
the CAAR earned after the mergers announcement is the same as the CAAR earned 
before the merger announcement. 
The results obtained when analysing the acquisition of private companies showed that 
the CAARs means were significantly different. Post-acquisition returns were positive, 
implying that the acquisitions of private companies did add value to the shareholders 
of the acquiring companies. This is linked with the fact that the average bid price or 
purchase price is usually lower. The majority of acquisitions were related to the 
acquisitions of private companies by listed companies and these findings are in line 
with the findings from other studies by Capron and Shen (2007) and Corhay and Rad 
(1996). Thus, null hypothesis 3(a) was rejected and the alternate hypothesis that 
states that the CAAR earned after the listed company acquires a non-listed company 
is greater than CAAR earned before merger announcements. 
The acquisitions of publicly listed companies did not result in any significant returns to 
the shareholders of the acquiring companies, with post-acquisition returns being 
negative and statistically different from the pre-acquisition returns. This resulted in the 
retention of the null hypothesis 3(b) that stated that the CAAR earned before the listed 
company acquires another listed company is the same as the CAAR earned after the 
merger announcement. 
Chapter Five presents the conclusion with recommendations derived from the findings 
obtained in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Introduction 
This study examined the impact of M&As on the shareholder wealth of JSE listed 
companies when acquiring private non-listed companies compared to public listed 
companies. The previous chapter presented a detailed discussion of the findings from 
the study. This chapter presents a summary of the research methodology used in the 
study as well as conclusions on the results from the previous chapter. Following this, 
contributions of the study as well as limitations of the study and possible future 
research directions are highlighted. 
 Research hypothesis, methodology, and design. 
This research study analysed the impact of M&As on the shareholder value of JSE 
listed acquiring companies. The focus was on analysing the impact when acquiring a 
private company compared to acquiring a public company. The study investigated the 
impact on share prices when M&A events were announced. The study also 
investigated the difference in pre-acquisition returns and post-acquisition returns, and, 
lastly, the difference in returns when acquiring a private company compared to returns 
when acquiring a public company. 
The research study used the EVM, applying the market model to analyse the impact 
of M&As on the shareholder value of the acquiring company. The companies involved 
in M&As were obtained from the Competition Commission website for a period of six 
years from 2011 to 2016. The final sample was 94 companies listed on the JSE that 
were involved in M&As. The IRESS database was used to obtain share price 
information. 
 Findings 
5.3.1 Share price abnormal returns. 
The EVM was used to analyse the movement in the share price before the 
announcement and share price after the announcement for any significant differences 
in all the three window periods. Evidence from all the event window periods, 3, 21 and 
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41 days, showed that the CAAR mean indicated an increasing trend after the 
announcement of the M&A. Although the trend was positive for the CAAR mean, it 
was not statistically significant. This implies that the shareholders of the JSE acquiring 
companies did not obtain any benefit from the M&As. Therefore, the announcements 
of the M&As did not have any impact on the overall share price, and thus had no value 
for the shareholders of the acquiring company. These results are in line with the 
management utility theory that states that managers will sometimes attempt to 
maximise their own interests and their interests do not necessarily correspond to 
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. Recent studies that also concluded that M&As 
do not add any value for the shareholders include studies done by Ficici (2018), 
Ahmed et al. (2018), and Viljoen (2014). Therefore, it is important that when a 
company plans to acquire another company, a detailed plan should be analysed to 
determine whether it would generate positive and significant returns for the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. The board must approve all the M&A 
transactions. The interests of all the different stakeholders must be considered before 
the transaction is approved. 
5.3.2 Difference in pre-announcement returns and post-announcement returns 
AARs and CAARs were analysed for the whole sample of 94 companies to compare 
the returns earned before the announcement of the M&A to the returns earned after 
the announcement of the M&A. The evidence showed that the CAAR mean before the 
announcement of the M&As was positive but not was not significant statistically. The 
expectation was that there should be positive ARs earned after the M&As. The findings 
showed that the CAAR mean earned after the announcement of the M&A was positive 
but not significant statistically. Therefore, in as much as the returns were positive, they 
were not significant statistically, implying that no real value was created for the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. One of the common reasons the returns were 
insignificant was due to the market being sceptical about the transactions due to them 
being highly risky (Shah & Arora, 2014). These results are also in line with the 
management utility theory that states that managers will sometimes attempt to 
maximise their own interests and their interests do not necessarily correspond with 
maximisation of the shareholders’ wealth. The returns earned after the M&A were not 
significant; therefore, there was no value being created for the shareholders.  
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5.3.3 Difference in abnormal returns when acquiring a private company 
compared to public company 
The findings from acquiring private companies showed that the CAAR mean had AR 
for acquisitions of private companies. This implies that the returns earned when 
acquiring a private company were significantly greater. Therefore, the acquisitions of 
private companies do add value to the shareholders of the acquiring companies. The 
findings support the neoclassical profit maximisation theory which states that 
companies will generally participate in M&As if shareholders’ wealth in the acquiring 
company will be created. 
Contrary to that were the acquisitions of public companies where the CAAR mean was 
positive but was not significant statistically. The findings suggested that the acquisition 
of public companies did not bring any returns to the shareholders of the acquiring 
companies.  
Therefore, is it recommended that when a company is considering acquiring an 
existing company, it should preferably be a private company as it yields significant 
positive ARs compared to acquiring a public listed company. If M&As are considered 
as a preferred method of growth, the board should make sure that the transactions will 
bring returns to the shareholders. All the M&A transactions must be approved by the 
shareholders. 
 Contributions of the study 
The findings of this study contribute to improved acquisition processes and a 
subsequent possible improvement on shareholder value of M&As. This study 
contributes to M&A literature by exploring an important part of the section of the market 
for corporate control that has not been explored fully in South Africa. The most recent 
study that was carried out in South Africa on M&As by Ndlovu (2017) focused on 
overall returns to shareholders after the merger announcements. In South Africa there 
has been no focus on comparing ARs earned by a listed company obtaining control of 
another listed company to ARs earned when a listed company obtains control of a 
private company.  
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The empirical evidence explored the impact on earnings when the acquiring company 
acquires control in public company compared to earnings when acquiring a private 
company. The findings show that the acquisitions of private companies bring positive 
significant returns to the shareholders while acquisitions of public companies bring 
negative returns. Due to lower costs and administration for acquiring private 
companies, the price is usually lower and that leads to gains for shareholders of the 
acquiring companies. This information will benefit the companies that are planning to 
embark on M&As as they will have knowledge of which acquisitions will add value to 
the shareholders. This study also contributes significantly to the accounting and 
business economics industry by offering evidence based recommendations for future 
M&A transactions. 
 Limitations 
The first limitation applied to this study was that it focused only on acquiring companies 
listed on the JSE, due to the lack of information for the companies that were not listed. 
Therefore, the findings cannot be generalised to non-listed companies.  
The second limitation was that the time period was from 2011 to 2016 which was only 
six years of data that were tested. Therefore, the study focused only on the short term 
measures within a particular time constraint. 
 Recommendations for future research 
Future research could focus on different types of M&As, analysing these separately. 
This can be done to determine which type of M&A is more successful compared to the 
others, as the information could be very beneficial to companies who are considering 
M&As. 
The time period could be extended as this study was restricted to acquisitions that 
took place from 2011 to 2016, to determine whether the outcomes would be different 
when analysing over a longer period. 
Finally, this study considered only the short term impact of M&As. Future studies could 
consider the impact of acquiring a private company compared to public M&As on the 
long term performance basis. 
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 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings from this study. The overall studies showed that 
the AARs and CAARs were not different significantly. Therefore, no additional value 
was added to the shareholders of the acquiring company. The analysis of the pre-M&A 
returns compared to the post-M&A returns indicated that the differences were not 
different significantly. Lastly, the comparisons of returns earned when acquiring a 
private company reflected that the CAAR mean was significantly greater. Therefore, 
acquiring private companies did add value to the shareholders of the acquiring 
companies. The analysis of public companies showed that the acquisition of public 
companies did not bring any significant returns as the CAAR mean was not 
significantly statistically greater. The board of directors and shareholders should 
approve all the M&As’ transactions to minimise the chances of acquiring companies 
that would not give returns to the shareholders.  
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APPENDIX A: STUDY SAMPLE 
 
 Primary Acquiring Firm Market Cap Sector Primary Target Firm 
1 Hosken Consolidated  Limited R 11035634185 Financials KWV Holdings Limited 
2 Tiger Brands Limited R 36 826 858 656  Consumer Goods Davita Trading (Pty) Ltd 
3 Investec Property Limited R 15 322 507 274  Financials The Edgardale Properties 
4 Reunert Limited R 13 288 229 595  Industrials ECN Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 
5 
Discovery Health Medical 
Scheme 
R 23 334 794 355  Financials UMed Medical Scheme 
6 FirstRand Limited R 109 996 242 352  Financials MMI Holdings 
7 Hudaco Industries Limited R 2 825 958 934  Industrials Filter and Hose Solutions (Pty) Ltd 
8 African Equity Empowerement R 210 415 956  Industrials Premier Fishing Brands 
9 Transpaco Limited R 367 343 878  Industrials Disaki Cores and Tubes (Pty) Ltd 
10 Tsogo Sun Hotels R 4 148 102 233  Consumer Services Gold Reef Resorts Limited 
11 Gold Fields R 86 914 375 106  Basic Materials Gold  Brands Investments 
12 The Spar Group Limited R 16 783 492 732  Consumer Services Northern Light Trading 128 (Pty) Ltd 
13 Aveng (Africa) Limited R 17 052 028 460  Industrials Dynamic Fluid Control (Pty) Ltd 
14 RMB Holdings Limited R 46 550 791 056  Financials Alexander Forbes Group 
15 Standard Bank Group Limited R 156 888 779 087  Financials 
Credit Suisse Standard Bank 
Securities (Pty) Ltd 
16 Jasco Electronics Holdings Ltd R 146 399 336  Industrials Ferrotech 
17 Murray & Roberts Steel Ltd R 8 513 045 677  Industrials SA Rebar Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
18 
Andulela Investment Holdings 
Ltd 
R 786 718 853  Financials Pro-Roof Steel Merchants (Pty) Ltd 
19 AECI Limited R 9 845 388 214  Basic Materials Qwemico Distributors (Pty) Ltd 
20 Redefine Properties Limited R 19 907 273 554  Financials Bakford Properties (Pty) Ltd  
21 Northam Platinum Limited R 3 471 926 622 Basic Materials Mvelaphanda Resources Limited 
22 Pick 'n Pay Retailers Ltd R 22 386 515 158  Consumer Services African Spirit Trading 90 (Pty) Ltd 
23 Growthpoint Properties Ltd R 11 472 485 700  Financials 
Design Square Shopping Centre (Pty) 
Ltd 
24 Hyprop Investments Limited R 12 945 776 249  Financials Attfund Retail Limited 
25 Woolworths  Ltd R 32 579 754 987  Consumer Services Q Retail Services cc 
26 The JSE Limited R 6 168 309 600  Financials 
Momentum  Platform Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd  
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 Primary Acquiring Firm Market Cap Sector Primary Target Firm 
27 PSG Konsult Limited R 9 115 137 534  Financials Western Group Holdings Limited 
28 Afrimat Limited R  604 567 378  Industrials Infrasors Holdings Limited 
29 Mondi Limited R 21 042 898 126  Basic Materials Mondi Shanduka Newsprint (Pty) Ltd 
30 Liberty Group Limited R 22 747 364 606  Financials Arctic Sun Trading 17 (Pty) Ltd 
31 Growthpoint Properties Ltd R 31 560 347 499  Financials  Bellville Trading (pty) Ltd 
32 Nampak Products Limited R 15 747 539 158  Industrials Elopak South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
33 Shoprite Checkers Ltd R 74 021 902 452  Consumer Services Kwa- Nongoma Trading (Pty) Ltd  
34 Conoration Fund Managers R 7 146 395 658  Financials  Growthpoint Properties 
35 Sasol Holdings  R 248 300 324 868  Oil and Gas Merichem Company 
36 Pioneer Foods  R 12 077 465 520  Consumer Goods Amaqanda Farms (Pty) Ltd 
37 Sephaku Holdings Limited R 532 551 269  Basic Materials Metier Mixed Concrete (Pty) Ltd 
38 Vukile Property Fund Limited R 7 444 064 582  Financials 
Refine Retail (Pty) Ltd, previously 
known as Paxospot (Pty) Ltd 
39 Massmart Holdings Limited R 41 446 901 975  Consumer Goods Capensis Investments 241 (Pty) Ltd 
40 Datatec Limited R 9 440 873 832  Technology Comztek Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
41 OneLogix Ltd R 440 030 946  Industrials RSA Tankers (Pty) Ltd t/a United Bulk 
42 
Rebosis Property Fund 
Limited 
R 2 887 621 831  Financials Dreamfair Properties 26 (Pty) Ltd,  
43 Delta Property Fund Limited R 1 385 457 066  Financials 
Four properties owned by Manaka 
Property Investments (Pty) Ltd 
44 Raubex Group Limited R 3 109 430 690  Industrials Tosas Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
45 Shoprite Checkers Ltd R 116 683 499 570  Consumer Goods  Mayville Mall Liquors 
46 
Rebosis Property Fund 
Limited 
R 2 887 621 831  Financials 
Centre of The Sun Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 
47 The Bidvest Group Limited R 70 632 599 850  Industrials 
Amalgamated Appliance Holdings 
Limited 
48 Ingenuity Property Investment R 546 527 000  Financials 
Insight Property Developers (Palmyra 
Road) (Pty) Ltd 
49 
Sanlam Investment Holdings 
Ltd 
R 94 017 000 000  Financials 
Simeka Employment Benefits 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
50 Hyprop Investment Limited R 18 609 091 038  Financials 
Sycom Property Fund Managers 
Limited 
51 York Timbers Ltd R 1 209 028 179  Basic Materials 
The Thorpe Timber Company and 
Timber Preservation Services 
business 
52 Stefanutti Stocks Ltd R 1 956 039 758  Industrials 
Energotec (a division of First Strut 
(Pty) Ltd) 
53 Mpact Limited R 400 185 146  Industrials Detpak South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
54 Pick 'n Pay Retailers Ltd R 24 980 660 692  Consumer Goods Royal Victory Trading 55 (Pty) Ltd 
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 Primary Acquiring Firm Market Cap Sector Primary Target Firm 
55 Redefine Properties Limited R 29 911 328 340  Financials Chantilly Trading 95 (Pty) Ltd  
56 Dis-Chem Pharmacies  R 19 128 736 278  Consumer Goods The CJ Wholesalers Business 
57 Shoprite Checkers  R 93 575 031 440  Consumer Goods Mossel Bay Family Store (Pty) Ltd 
58 
Grindrod Holdings South 
Africa  
R 16 839 451 751  Industrials Xceed Resources Limited 
59 Delta Property Fund Limited R 3 499 521 400  Financials Walk CC and Ziningi Properties (Pty)  
60 
Growthpoint Properties 
Limited 
R 47 005 234 788  Financials Abseq Properties (Pty) Ltd 
61 Woolworths Ltd R 63 228 002 516  Consumer Goods Dula Investments (Pty) Ltd 
62 The Bidvest Group Limited R 88 006 826 491  Industrials Academy Brushware (Pty) Ltd 
63 
SA Corporate Real Estate 
Fund 
R 7 900 571 125  Financials 
An Industrial Proprerty of Eveready 
(Pty) Ltd 
64 PPC Limited R 19 008 920 947  Industrials Safika Cement Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
65 
Discovery Health Medical 
Scheme 
R 50 013 216 955  Financials Afrox Medical Aid Society 
66 
Ingenuity Property 
Investments Limited 
R 1 078 207 893  Financials The rental enterprise and property 
67 Redefine Properties Limited R 40 280 613 866  Financials 
Grapnel Property Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 
68 Tradehold Limited R 3 172 692 584  Financials Mettle Investments (Pty) Ltd 
69 Sibanye Gold Limited  R 2 084 783 643  Basic Materials 
Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold 
Resources Limited 
70 Barloworld SA Limited R 22 126 113 045  Industrials 
Leatoy Proprietary Limited t/a Leach 
Toyota 
71 Imperial Group Limited R 38 445 914 305  Industrials Mitsubishi Motors Paarden Eiland 
72 Pick 'n Pay Retailers Ltd R 25 642 900 531  Consumer Goods Quintado 159 (Pty) Ltd 
73 Emira Property Fund Limited R 8 842 727 454  Financials 
 Property Fund and Strategic Real 
Estate Managers (Pty) Ltd 
74 MMI Group Limited R 7 246 767 671  Financials 
Smart Life Insurance Company 
Limited 
75 
Afrocentric Investment 
Corporation Limited 
R 2 432 846 525  Health Care 
Certain assets of WAD Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd 
76 Rhodes Food Grou Limited R 3 343 730 000  Consumer Goods Boland Pulp Proprietary Limited 
77 Equites Property Fund Limited  R 1 258 513 905  Financials Intaprop Proprietary Limited 
78 Pan African Resource PLC R 3 550 189 840  Basic Materials 
Blue Falcon 232 Trading Proprietary 
Limited 
79 Santam Limited R 25 659 479 655  Financials 
Professional Provident Society 
Marketing Services (Pty)Ltd 
80 Telkom SA SOC Limited R 36 454 872 860  Telecommunications The Bellville Property 
81 
Sun International (South 
Africa) Limited 
R 14 711 286 749  Consumer Services GPI Slots (Proprietary) Limited  
82 
Accelerate Property Fund 
Limited  
R 4 681 655 090  Financials The Redevelopment of Fourways Mall 
83 Rolfes Holdings Limited R 369 272 187  Basic Materials Bragan Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 
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 Primary Acquiring Firm Market Cap Sector Primary Target Firm 
84 Tiso Blackstar Group SE R  972 748 724  Consumer Services Robor (Pty) Ltd 
85 Vodacom Ltd  R 226 779 069 140  Telecommunications Altech Autopage Cellular 
86 Remgro R  117 972 092 987  Industrials RCL Foods 
87 
Stellar Capital Partners 
Limited 
R 2 184 076 879  Financials Friedshelf 1678 Limited 
88 enX Group Limited R 1 180 886 702  Industrials 
West African International 
(Proprietary) Limited 
89 Mpact Limited R 7 790 097 575  Industrials 
Remade Holdings (Pty) Ltd and the 
Property Companies 
90 Deneb Investments Limited  R 1 285 811 225  Financials 
Premier Rainwatergoods Proprietary 
Limited 
91 Balwin Proprietary Limited R 4 117 519 402  Financials The Development Rights 
92 Liberty Group Limited  R 32 964 789 322  Financials 
Trans African Concessions 
Proprietary Limited 
93 Remgro R 118 041 853 411  Industrials Mediclinic 
94 RMB Holdings Limited R 93 737 093 675  Financials 
Atterbury Property Holdings 
Proprietary Limited 
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APPENDIX E: LETTER CONFIRMING EDITING 
 
